



Interpreting the Unconventional 
U.S. Monetary Policy of 2007–09
ABSTRACT This paper reviews the unconventional U.S. monetary policy
responses to the ﬁnancial and real crises of 2007–09, dividing these responses
into three groups: interest rate policy, quantitative policy, and credit policy. To
interpret interest rate policy, it compares the Federal Reserve’s actions with
the literature on optimal policy in a liquidity trap. This comparison suggests
that policy has been in the direction indicated by theory, but it has not gone far
enough. To interpret quantitative policy, the paper reviews the determination
of inﬂation under different policy regimes. The main danger for inﬂation from
current actions is that the Federal Reserve may lose its policy independence; a
beneﬁcial side effect of the crisis is that the Friedman rule can be implemented
by paying interest on reserves. To interpret credit policy, the paper presents a
new model of capital market imperfections with different ﬁnancial institutions
and roles for securitization, leveraging, and mark-to-market accounting. The
model suggests that providing credit to traders in securities markets is a more
effective response than extending credit to the originators of loans.
T
he last two years have been an exciting time to be a student of mone-
tary policy and central banking. Variability in the data is what allows
us to learn about the world, and variability has not been in short supply in
the United States, with wide swings in asset prices, threats to financial
stability, concerns about regulation, sharply rising unemployment, and a
global recession. But these have been difﬁcult times to be a central banker.
The limited tools at the disposal of the Federal Reserve have been far
from sufﬁcient to put out so many ﬁres, and many of the challenges have
caught central bankers unprepared for what not so long ago seemed highly
improbable.
This paper reviews the Federal Reserve’s actions in 2007–09 and inter-
prets them in the light of economic theory. “Interpret” is the operative word
here, since any attempt to describe and evaluate all that has happened would
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would take a book, or perhaps many books, to describe and account for it
all. On the other hand, the crisis and its repercussions are far from over,
so that any assessment runs the risk of quickly becoming obsolete. I will
therefore avoid, as far as I can, making pronouncements on what policies
seem right or wrong, even with the beneﬁt of hindsight, and I will not give
a comprehensive account of all the events and policies. My more modest
ambition is to provide an early summary of monetary policy’s reaction to
the crisis thus far, to interpret this reaction using economic theory, and to
identify some of the questions that it raises.
I start in section I with brief accounts of the crisis and of the Federal
Reserve’s responses. These fall into three categories. The first is interest
rate policy and concerns the targets that the Federal Reserve sets for the
interest rates that it controls. Figure 1 illustrates the recent changes by
plotting two key interest rates targeted by the Federal Reserve over the
last 20 years. These rates are as low today as they have been in this entire
period, and the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) has stated its
intent to keep them close to zero for the foreseeable future.
1
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Figure 1. Interest Rates Targeted by the Federal Reserve, August 1989–August 2009
1. Operating procedures for the discount window changed in January 2003, and therefore a
consistent discount rate series for the whole period does not exist. For the federal funds rate in
2009, I plot the upper end of the range targeted by the Federal Reserve. The ﬁgure also shows
the interest rate on reserves that was introduced in October 2008, discussed further below.
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2. U.S. Treasury bills are three-month securities; total Treasury securities include bonds
and notes, which have longer maturities. The ﬁgure includes only securities held outright,
not those held as part of repurchase agreements.
Figure 2. Adjusted Reserves and Monetary Base, 1929–2009
Source: Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, Federal Reserve Economic Data (FRED).
a. Reserves are adjusted for the effects of changes in statutory reserve requirements on the quantity of 
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Figure 2 illustrates the second set of policies, which I label quantitative
policy. These involve changes in the size of the balance sheet of the Federal
Reserve and in the composition of its liabilities. The ﬁgure plots an adjusted
measure of reserves held by banks in the Federal Reserve System and the
monetary base (currency plus reserves), both as ratios to GDP, since 1929.
In September 2009 adjusted reserves were equal to 6.8 percent of GDP, a
value exceeded in the history of the Federal Reserve System only once,
between June and December 1940. The monetary base is as large relative
to GDP as it has ever been in the last 50 years.
The third set of policies, which I label credit policy, consists of managing
the asset side of the Federal Reserve’s balance sheet. To gauge the radical
change in the composition of these assets since the crisis began, ﬁgure 3
plots the ratios of U.S. Treasury bills and of all Treasury securities held by
the Federal Reserve to its total assets.
2 From a status quo where the Federal
Reserve held almost exclusively Treasury securities, in the last two years it
has switched toward holding many other types of assets and, more recently,
toward securities with longer maturities.
I start my assessment in section II with this last group of policies,
because they are the least understood in theory. Using a new model of
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capital markets, I investigate the effects of the Federal Reserve’s different
investments on the availability of credit.
3 In the model, four groups of
actors—entrepreneurs, lenders, traders, and investors—all have funds that
must be reallocated through the financial system toward investment and
production, but frictions among these groups may lead to credit shortages
at different points in the system. Different credit programs implemented
by the central bank will have different effects depending on whether they
tighten or loosen these credit constraints, and depending on the equilibrium
interactions between different markets. Drawing on the model, section III
goes on to suggest that whereas the Federal Reserve’s credit policies to
date have been directed at a wide range of markets and institutions, focus-
ing the central bank’s efforts on senior secured loans to traders in securities
markets would be the most effective way to ﬁght the crisis.
Next, in section IV, I move to quantitative policy and ask the following
question: do the recent increases in reserves and in the central bank’s balance
sheet undermine the ability of the current policy regime to control inﬂation?
I show that according to a standard model of price-level determination, the
regime is threatened only if the Federal Reserve becomes excessively con-
cerned with the state of its balance sheet, or if it gives in to pressure from
the ﬁscal authorities, effectively surrendering its independence.
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Figure 3. U.S. Treasury Securities Held Outright by the Federal Reserve, 
June 1996–August 2009
Sources: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, “Credit and Liquidity Programs and the 
Balance Sheet,” statistical release H.4.1, “Factors Affecting Reserve Balances,” various issues.
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literature on optimal monetary policy in a liquidity trap, which recommends
committing to higher than normal inﬂation in the future and keeping the
policy interest rate at zero even after the negative real shocks have passed.
Although the Federal Reserve’s actions ﬁt these prescriptions qualitatively,
they seem too modest relative to what theory calls for. Section VI concludes.
I. What Has the Federal Reserve Been Up To?
There already exist some thorough descriptions of the events of the U.S.
ﬁnancial crisis of 2007–09.
4 After a brief and selective summary, this sec-
tion catalogs the policies followed by the Federal Reserve in response to
these events.
I.A. The Financial Crisis and the Real Crisis
In August 2007 an increase in delinquencies in subprime mortgages led
to a sharp fall in the prices of triple-A-rated mortgage-backed securities and
raised suspicions about the value of the underlying assets. Because many
banks held these securities, either directly or through special investment
vehicles, doubts were cast over the state of banks’ balance sheets generally.
Through 2007 the fear became widespread that many banks might fail, and
interbank lending rates spiked to levels well above those in the federal funds
market. This increase in risk spreads diffused over many markets, and in a
few, notably the markets for commercial paper, private asset-backed secu-
rities, and collateralized debt obligations, the decline in trading volume
was extreme, apparently due to lack of demand.
In the real economy, the U.S. business cycle peaked in December 2007,
according to the National Bureau of Economic Research. Unemployment
began rising steadily from 4.9 percent in December 2007 to just over 10 per-
cent in October 2009, and output decelerated sharply in 2008Q1. Net
acquisition of ﬁnancial assets by households fell from $1.02 trillion in
2007 to $562 billion in 2008 and to just $281 billion and $19 billion in the
ﬁrst and second quarters of 2009, respectively, according to the Federal
Reserve’s Flow of Funds Accounts. As of the start of 2008, however, there
was still no sharp fall in total bank lending.
In March 2008 the investment bank Bear Stearns found itself on the
verge of bankruptcy, unable to roll over its short-term ﬁnancing. The gov-
ernment, in a joint effort by the Federal Reserve and the Treasury, stepped
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4. See Brunnermeier (2009), Gorton (2009), and Greenlaw and others (2008).
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ing government guarantees on some of Bear Stearns’ assets. Risk spreads
remained high, and the asset-backed securities market was effectively closed
for the rest of the year, but some calm then returned to markets until the
dark week of September 15 to 21 arrived.
The extent of the crash during these seven days probably ﬁnds its rival
only in the stock market crash of October 1929. It was marked by three
distinct events. The ﬁrst, on September 15, was the bankruptcy of Lehman
Brothers, the largest company ever to fail in U.S. history. This investment
bank was a counterparty in many financial transactions across several
markets, and its failure triggered defaults on contracts all over the world.
The second event was the bailout of American International Group (AIG),
one of the largest insurance companies in the world, on the evening of
September 16. The bailout not only signaled that ﬁnancial losses went well
beyond investment banks, but also increased the uncertainty about how
the government would respond to subsequent large bankruptcies. The third
event, on September 20, was the announcement of the ﬁrst version of the
Troubled Asset Relief Program, or TARP (also known as the “Paulson
plan” after Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson), which, although potentially
far-reaching, was both short on detail and vague in its provisions.
In the six months that followed, the stock market plunged: having
already fallen 24.7 percent from its peak a year earlier, the S&P 500 index
fell another 31.6 percent from September 2008 to March 2009. Most mea-
sures of volatility, risk, and liquidity spreads increased to unprecedented
levels, and measures of real activity around the world declined. Which of
the three events was the main culprit for the ﬁnancial crisis that followed
is a question that will surely motivate much discussion and research in the
years to come.
5
Through all these events, the Treasury cooperated with the Federal
Reserve while also pursuing its own policies in response to the crisis.
Today, these include a plan to invest up to $250 billion in banks to shore
up their capital, assistance to homeowners unable to pay their mortgages,
and up to $100 billion of TARP money in public-private investments to buy
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5. The situation at the time looked so dire that the head of the International Monetary
Fund, Dominique Strauss-Kahn, stated apocalyptically on October 11 that “Intensifying
solvency concerns about a number of the largest U.S.-based and European ﬁnancial institu-
tions have pushed the global ﬁnancial system to the brink of systemic meltdown” (“Statement
by the IMF Managing Director, Dominique Strauss-Kahn, to the International Monetary
and Financial Committee on the Global Economy and Financial Markets, Washington,
October 11”).
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some stability has returned to ﬁnancial markets, with risk spreads shrinking
and the stock market partly recovering. Forecasts of unemployment and
output, however, have yet to show clear signs of improvement.
Finally, inflation as measured using the year-on-year change in the
consumer price index has fallen from 4.1 percent in December 2007 to 
−1.3 percent in September 2009. Inﬂation forecasts for the coming year, as
indicated by the median answer in the Survey of Professional Forecasters,
have fallen from 3.6 percent in the last quarter of 2007 to 0.7 percent in the
third quarter of 2009, and the forecast for average inﬂation over the next
10 years has risen slightly, from 2.4 percent to 2.5 percent.
I.B. The Federal Reserve’s Actions during the Crisis
The Federal Reserve typically chooses from a very narrow set of actions
in its conduct of monetary policy. It intervenes in the federal funds market,
where many banks make overnight loans, by engaging in open-market
operations with a handful of banks that are primary dealers. These operations
involve collateralized purchases and sales of Treasury securities, crediting
or debiting the banks’ holdings of reserves at the central bank. The Federal
Reserve announces a desired target for the equilibrium interest rate in the
federal funds market and ensures that the market clears close to this rate
every day.
Over the course of the last two years, however, the Federal Reserve’s
activities have expanded dramatically. Table 1 provides snapshots of these
recent actions at three points in time: in January 2007, before the start of
the crisis (and representative of the decade before); at the end of December
2008, in the midst of the crisis; and in August 2009. The Federal Reserve’s
policies ﬁt into three broad categories.
6
The ﬁrst is interest rate policy. Starting from a target for the federal funds
rate of 5.25 percent for the ﬁrst half of 2007, the Federal Reserve gradually
reduced that target to effectively zero by December 2008.
7 In its policy
announcements, the Federal Reserve has made clear that it expects to keep
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6. For alternative descriptions of the policy responses to the crisis, see Cecchetti (2009)
for the United States and Blanchard (2009) for an international perspective, as well as the
many speeches by governors of the Federal Reserve available on its “News & Events”
page (www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/default.htm). An up-to-date exposition is the
Federal Reserve’s statement of its “Credit and Liquidity Programs and the Balance Sheet”
(www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/bst.htm).
7. More precisely, in December 2008 the Federal Reserve started announcing upper and
lower limits for this rate, which at that time were 0.25 percent and zero.
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Table 1. Balance Sheet of the Federal Reserve, Selected Dates, 2007–09a
Billions of dollars
Assets Liabilities and capital
January 3, 2007
Securities held outright Federal Reserve notes 781.3
U.S. Treasury bills 277.0 Commercial bank reserves 20.0
U.S. Treasury notes and bonds 501.9 U.S. Treasury deposits 6.2
Agency debt 0 Reverse repurchase agreements 29.7
Repurchase agreements 39.8 Other liabilities 10.6
Direct loans 1.3
Gold 11.0 Total liabilities 847.9
Foreign reserves 20.5
Other assets 16.7 Capital 30.6
Total 878.5 Total 878.5
Memorandum: federal funds 
target rate 5.25%
December 31, 2008
Securities held outright Federal Reserve notes 853.2
U.S. Treasury bills 18.4 Commercial bank reserves 860.0
U.S. Treasury notes and bonds 457.5 U.S. Treasury deposits 365.4
Agency debt 19.7 Reverse repurchase agreements 88.4
Repurchase agreements 80.0 Others 56.8
Direct loans 193.9
Gold 11.0 Total liabilities 2,223.8
Foreign reserves 579.8
Other assets 40.3 Capital 42.2
New asset categories
Term Auction Facility (TAF) 450.2
Commercial Paper Funding   334.1
Facility (CPFF)
Maiden Lane 73.9
Total 2,265.9 Total 2,265.9
Memorandum: federal funds 
target rate 0.0–0.25%
this rate at zero for an extended period.8 Starting in October 2008, the
Federal Reserve has also been paying interest on both required and excess
reserves held by commercial banks; since December 2008 the interest rate
on these reserves (shown in figure 1) has been the same as the upper end
of the target range for the federal funds rate. This implies that banks no
8. The December 2008 press release of the FOMC stated that “the Committee antici-
pates that weak economic conditions are likely to warrant exceptionally low levels of the
federal funds rate for some time.” The commitment to low interest rates has been reafﬁrmed
at every meeting since then, with slightly different wording since March 2009.
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9. The Federal Reserve also controls the interest rate that it charges banks that borrow
from it directly at the discount window. Although banks rarely use the discount window dur-
ing normal times, this facility can be important during crises.
10. For instance, in April 2009 Vice Chairman Donald Kohn stated that “the Federal
Reserve has begun making substantial purchases of longer-term securities in order to support
market functioning and reduce interest rates in the mortgage and private credit markets” (“Poli-
cies to Bring Us Out of the Financial Crisis and Recession,” speech delivered at the College of
Wooster, Wooster, Ohio, April 3, 2009). Chairman Ben Bernanke stated that “The principal
goal of these programs is to lower the cost and improve the availability of credit for households
and businesses” (“The Federal Reserve’s Balance Sheet,” speech delivered at the Federal
Reserve Bank of Richmond 2009 Credit Markets Symposium, Charlotte, N.C., April 3, 2009).
Table 1. Balance Sheet of the Federal Reserve, Selected Dates, 2007–09 (Continued)
Billions of dollars
Assets Liabilities and capital
August 19, 2009
Securities held outright Federal Reserve notes 871.5
U.S. Treasury bills 18.4 Commercial bank reserves 818.8
U.S. Treasury notes and bonds 717.7 U.S. Treasury deposits 240.2
Agency debt 111.8 Reverse repurchase agreements 68.4
Repurchase agreements 0 Others 14.4
Direct loans 106.3
Gold 11.0 Total liabilities 2,013.3
Foreign reserves and other assets 76.7
New asset categories Capital 50.5
Term Auction Facility (TAF) 221.1




Central bank liquidity swaps 69.1
Total 2,063.8 Total 2,063.8
Memorandum: federal funds 
target rate 0.0–0.25%
Sources: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, “Credit and Liquidity Programs and the Bal-
ance Sheet,” statistical release H.4.1; “Factors Affecting Reserve Balances,” various issues; and Federal
Reserve Bank of New York, “Treasury and Federal Reserve Foreign Exchange Operations,” various issues.
a. Items may not sum to totals because of rounding.
longer pay an effective tax on reserves held at the central bank beyond the
legal requirements. It also means that the Federal Reserve in the future has
at its disposal a new policy instrument, the spread between the federal funds
rate and the rate on reserves.
9 Finally, the Federal Reserve has purchased
other securities with the stated intent of affecting their prices and yields,
but there is little evidence of success.
10
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of the Federal Reserve’s balance sheet and the composition of its liabilities.
Historically, the bulk of these liabilities has consisted of currency in circu-
lation plus bank reserves (most of which the banks are required by law to
hold at the level mandated by the Federal Reserve) and deposits of the
Treasury and foreign central banks. With the onset of the crisis, the ﬁrst
change in quantitative policy was that the Federal Reserve’s balance sheet
more than doubled. Reserves accounted for much of this increase and are
now mostly voluntary, since the penalty for holding reserves instead of
lending in the federal funds market effectively disappeared once the inter-
est rates on both became the same. The other signiﬁcant change was that
the U.S. Treasury became the single largest creditor of the Federal
Reserve. As a means of providing the Federal Reserve with Treasury secu-
rities to ﬁnance its lending programs, the Treasury has greatly expanded
its account, and in August 2009 it held more than one-tenth of the Federal
Reserve’s total liabilities.
The third category is credit policy. This consists of managing the
composition of the asset side of the Federal Reserve’s balance sheet. At the
start of the crisis, the central bank’s assets were similar in composition to
what they had been since its founding: mostly U.S. Treasury securities, with
over one-third in Treasury bills and the remainder made up of Treasury
bonds and notes together with modest amounts of foreign reserves. Round-
ing out the balance sheet were other assets (such as gold), but almost no
direct loans. By the height of the crisis in December 2008, however, this
picture had changed dramatically, following the announcement of several
new asset purchase programs.
11
The Federal Reserve’s December 31, 2008, balance sheet reveals several
important changes in its assets from two years earlier. Starting from the top
of the assets column, the ﬁrst is a signiﬁcant shift in the average maturity
of Treasury securities held from short to long. The second is a dramatic
increase in direct loans, with the Federal Reserve for the ﬁrst time lending
directly to entities other than banks. These included loans to primary
dealers through the 28-day TSLF and the overnight PDCF and, through
the TALF, to investors posting as collateral triple-A-rated asset-backed
securities on student loans, auto loans, credit card loans, and Small Business
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11. These included the Term Auction Facility (TAF), the Term Securities Lending
Facility (TSLF), the Primary Dealer Credit Facility (PDCF), the Commercial Paper Funding
Facility (CPFF), the Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility (TALF), the Asset-Backed
Commercial Paper Money Market Mutual Fund Liquidity Facility (AMLF), and the Money
Market Investor Funding Facility (MMIFF).
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reserves, reﬂecting a swap agreement with foreign central banks to tem-
porarily provide them with dollars against foreign currency. The next three
changes take the form of entirely new asset categories. First, through the
TAF, the Federal Reserve started lending to banks for terms of 28 and
84 days against collateral at terms determined at auction. These auctions
provide a means to lend to banks that preserves the recipients’ anonymity,
to prevent these loans from being seen by the market as a signal of trouble
at the debtor bank. In December 2008 these credits to banks accounted
for almost one quarter of the Federal Reserve’s assets. Second, through
the CPFF, the Federal Reserve bought 90-day commercial paper, thereby
ﬁnancing many companies directly without going through the banks. Finally,
the Federal Reserve created three limited-liability companies, Maiden Lane
LLC and Maiden Lane LLC II and III, to acquire and manage the assets
associated with the bailouts of AIG and Bear Stearns.
By August 2009 some of these programs had been reduced signiﬁcantly
inscope,inparticulartheholdingsofcommercialpaperandforeignreserves.
Others, however, continue to grow. In particular, in March 2009 the Fed-
eral Reserve announced it would purchase up to $300 billion in long-term
Treasury bonds and $1.45 trillion in agency debt and mortgage-backed
securities; it expects to reach these goals by the end of the ﬁrst quarter of
2010. These changes were announced at the FOMC meeting of March 2009
but had been under discussion for a few months before that. A large share
of these purchases is already reﬂected in the August balance sheet.
II. A Credit Frictions Model of Capital Markets
The crisis of 2007–09 has witnessed credit disruptions involving multiple
agents in many markets, it has seen large swings in asset-backed securities,
and it has propagated from ﬁnancial markets to the real economy. Unfortu-
nately, no off-the-shelf economic model contains all of these ingredients.
Before I can interpret the Federal Reserve’s policies, I must therefore take
a detour to introduce a new model that captures them.
Financial markets perform many roles, including the management of
risk and the transformation of maturities. In the model I abstract from these
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12. The Federal Reserve also made funds available to lend to the money market, through
the MMIFF for money market funds, and through the AMLF programs for banks to ﬁnance
purchases from money market funds. The ﬁrst program was never used; the funds under the
AMLF are included in the “direct loans” item on the balance sheet, but the balance is cur-
rently zero.
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reallocation of funds toward productive uses. I take as given a starting
distribution of funds across agents, and I study how trade in financial
markets shifts these funds to where they are needed, subject to limits due
to asymmetries of information. The model merges insights from the the-
ory of bank contracts based on limited pledgeability (Holmström and
Tirole 2009) with the theory of leverage based on collateral constraints
(Kiyotaki and Moore 1997; Matsuyama 2007). It is a simpler version of
a model fully developed in Reis (2009). The appendix lays out the model
in more detail.
II.A. Setting up the Model: Agents
The model has three periods, no aggregate uncertainty, and a representa-
tive consumer-worker. She supplies labor L in all three periods, earning a
wage W in each period, and consumes a ﬁnal good C″ in the last period,
which is a Dixit-Stiglitz aggregator of a continuum of varieties. The economy
has only one storable asset, in amount H, which I will refer to as capital. It
consists of claims issued by the government, which can be redeemed for the
consumption good in the ﬁnal period. The government levies a lump-sum
tax on the representative household in the last period to honor these claims.
13
The representative household has four different types of ﬁnancial agents,
each endowed with an initial allocation of capital. First, there are many
investors behaving competitively, who hold capital M.
Agents of the second type are entrepreneurs. There is a continuum of
them in the unit interval associated with each variety of the consumption
good. In the ﬁrst period they must hire F units of labor to set up operations.
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13. A few notes are in order regarding this capital. First, it is a very crude way to intro-
duce an asset in this economy that is used as a means of payment. However, it allows me to
keep the focus on the credit frictions and to avoid having to describe in detail the underlying
theory of money or assets. Second, although I assume that, like money, capital pays a zero
net return, generalizing the model to include a positive return does not change the results
qualitatively. Third, I use the term “capital” and not “money” because these assets can be
thought of as broader than just high-powered money. They represent any claims that can be
exchanged for consumption goods in the last period, and so they refer to all assets in this
economy. Fourth, these assets could be private claims issued by the representative con-
sumer, if the consumer could commit to their repayment, thus dispensing with the need for a
government or taxes. However, decentralizing this economy to justify the existence of the
representative consumer is a difﬁcult task. Fifth, an alternative would be to assume that H is
a physical good that can be stored without depreciating and can be transformed into the ﬁnal
consumption good in the ﬁnal period. This leads to predictions similar to those in this paper,
but messier algebra.
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olistically in the last period a variety of consumption goods in amount Yi″.
The production function is
At the optimal choice of labor in the second and third periods, v will be the
fraction of labor employed in the second period. Exogenous productivity, A′ i,
is independently and identically distributed across the continuum of ﬁrms
and is revealed in the second period, before the labor decision is made for
that period. With probability 1 −ϕit equals a, and with probability ϕ it is
zero. Therefore, if I ∈ [0, 1] projects are funded in the first period, only
N = (1 −ϕ )I yield positive output in the last period.
This production structure captures the maturing process of investments,
with expenses incurred in every period in order to obtain a payoff in the
last period, together with the risk that setup costs may not be recouped if
the technology turns out to be worthless. The entrepreneurial capital avail-
able is K, which is smaller than WF, so that entrepreneurs must seek outside
ﬁnancing.
Agents of the third type are lenders. Their distinguishing feature is
that only they have the ability to monitor the behavior of entrepreneurs.
If investors were to ﬁnance entrepreneurs directly, they could not prevent
them from running away with all of the funds. Lenders, in contrast, can
prevent the entrepreneurs from absconding with more than a share δ of
sales revenue. Entrepreneurs can therefore pledge 1 −δof this revenue to
lenders and zero to all other agents.
14 I assume that the pledgeable revenue
is enough to ensure positive pledgeable profits to lenders. A lender will
provide the capital needed to start the project, WF − K, as well as a line of
credit in the second period to pay wages WL′.
To fund these investments, lenders have capital D in the ﬁrst period and
may receive a new infusion D′ in the second period. If they require further
ﬁnancing, they can issue and sell securities, guaranteed by the loans they
make, totaling S for price Q in the ﬁrst period, and S′ for price Q′ in the



















14. This limited pledgeability constraint has a long tradition in the modeling of capital
market imperfections: see Matsuyama (2007) and Holmström and Tirole (2009) for recent
reviews. Note that one can reinterpret the F setup costs as the cost to lenders to set up the
monitoring technology to which only they have access, allowing them to capture 1 −δof the
revenue.
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if the project is in operation. In the data, lenders include all providers of
ﬁnancing to the nonﬁnancial sectors, including commercial banks, primary
issuers of commercial debt, some brokers, and others.
Traders are the fourth and ﬁnal group of agents. Although they cannot
monitor loans, together with lenders they have the unique ability to under-
stand and trade the lenders’ securities. In particular, in the ﬁrst period, lenders
could try to sell as many securities as they wanted whether they had proper
backing or not. Traders are the only agents who can verify that a recently
issued security has proper backing. Traders also observe the realization of
productivity in the second period, whereas investors do not. They therefore
perform the role of intermediating between lenders and investors so that
the latter have access to the securities. In the United States, traders include
investment banks, hedge funds, special investment vehicles set up by com-
mercial banks, and many others.
Traders have capital E in the ﬁrst period, and an additional E′ is available
to them in the second period. They can also obtain funds from investors,
but I assume that another friction prevents investors from effectively owning
the traders and acquiring access to their information technology. I again
use a pledgeability constraint, assuming that investors can seize at most a
share 1 − µ of the assets of a trader, so that this is the trader’s maximum
liability.
16 Therefore, in the first period, the trader’s total assets are E/µ,
where µ gives the inverse of the leverage multiplier. In the second period,
because traders enter with assets equal to the securities S, and these are
marked to market, their entering equity is E + [(1 −ϕ )Q′−Q]S/Q, reﬂecting
the capital gain (or loss) made on these investments. Because the trader
can get new loans against this marked-to-market equity position, the trader
can invest a further [(1 − µ)/µ][(1 −ϕ )Q′/Q − 1]S in the second period.
This ability to use capital gains to boost leverage is also emphasized by
Arvind Krishnamurthy (forthcoming) and by Andrei Shleifer and Robert
Vishny (2009).
17
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15. Note that S is the total revenue from selling the security in the ﬁrst period, so that
S/Q is the number of securities sold paying this amount of capital in the third period. The
same applies to S′.
16. I assume that even if traders abscond with the securities, they can show up to redeem
them in the last period.
17. Lenders cannot obtain direct ﬁnancing from investors, since in equilibrium their
assets will consist solely of the outstanding loans. Only lenders can monitor these loans, so
seizing the lenders’ assets would produce zero revenue.
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Having presented the agents, I now describe the markets in which they
interact in each period. In the first period, entrepreneurs need financing
to set up their ﬁrms. Because of the need for monitoring, only lenders are
willing to provide them with capital. Lenders behave competitively in
funding each project, but once a lender is matched with an entrepreneur,
they stay together until the last period. If lenders do not have enough
capital, they can issue securities, which only traders will choose to buy since
only they can ensure that the securities have proper backing. Investors
deposit funds with traders. I assume that K + D + E < WF, so that all funds
of all agents, including the investors, are required to set up all the projects.
In the second period, entrepreneurs require more capital and obtain it
from their line of credit with their lender. The lender may issue more secu-
rities, and traders can again choose to buy them. In this period, however,
investors can also buy the preexisting securities, because lenders and traders
have signaled, by trading them in the ﬁrst period, that these securities are
properlybacked.However,investorscannotdistinguishthesecuritiesbacked
by assets for which Ai ′=a from those for which Ai ′=0. Therefore, as long
as Q′ > 1 −ϕ , they will refrain from buying securities directly in this market.
Lenders and traders, on the other hand, can distinguish between the two
types of securities, so if investors stay out, the price of the Ai ′=0 securities
is zero, and Q′ refers to the price of the Ai ′=a securities.
Finally, in the third period, entrepreneurs obtain the revenue from sales,
pay the last-period workers, and pay back the lenders. The lenders, in turn,
use part of the proceeds to repay the holders of securities backed by the
loans, and traders return the funds belonging to investors. In the end, all
agents return their capital to the representative household. All of these
ﬁnancial market participants are risk-neutral and aim to maximize their
last-period payoff.
Figure 4 summarizes the timing and the ﬂows of funds just described. I
assume that there is enough liquidity to sustain the social optimum, where
all projects get funded and marginal costs depend only on wages and pro-
ductivity, which is equivalent to assuming that total capital H exceeds the
setup and up-front labor costs at the efficient level. The problem I focus
on here is the allocation of this liquidity, in the presence of the frictions
captured by the parameters δ, ϕ, and µ.
II.C. Closing the Model
To close the model, I need a few more ingredients, which are spelled out
in more detail in the appendix. The ﬁrst is the demand for each variety of
RICARDO REIS 133


























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































11941-05_Reis_rev2.qxd  1/26/10  11:33 AM  Page 134the goods, which is isoelastic: Yi″=C″Pi″m/(1−m), where C″ is total ﬁnal con-
sumption, and Pi″ is the price of the good. The lender and the entrepreneur
jointly decide the optimal scale of production for the productive ﬁrms in
the second and third periods so as to maximize joint returns:
subject to the production function in equation 1 and demand for the good.
The optimality condition is
together with L′=v(L′+L″). I assume that m ∈ [1, 2], so that markups are
between 0 and 100 percent, and that (1 −δ )m > 1, so that the pledgeable
proﬁts to lenders are positive.
In a symmetric equilibrium, the production of all ﬁrms is the same and
equal to Y. Total consumption is then C = NmY, which is increasing in the
number of goods produced because variety is valued. Moreover, all prices
are the same in equilibrium, which, since consumption goods and capital
have the same price, implies that N
1−mPi″=1, so the static cost-of-living
price index is constant. Finally, the labor supply function is C″=W, which
follows from assuming log preferences over consumption and linear dis-
utility of labor supply.
Combining all of these equations provides the solution for the following
endogenous variables: total employment L′+L′′ in the second and third
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Two restrictions on prices must hold so that there are no arbitrage
opportunities that would allow for infinite profits. First, since a security
bought in the first period for price Q will, with probability 1 −ϕ , be
worth Q′ in the second period, but zero otherwise, and since lenders can
sell it in the first period and buy it back in the second period, it must be
that Q ≤ (1 −ϕ )Q′. Otherwise, lenders would make infinite expected
profits.
18 Second, and similarly, because lenders can hold cash between
the second and the third period with a guaranteed return of 1, it must be
that Q′≤1.
I now characterize the equilibrium securities price and investment in the
ﬁrst period. In the securities market in the ﬁrst period, if Q < (1 −ϕ )Q′,
traders strictly prefer to buy securities rather than hold cash, and so their
total demand is E/µ. If Q = (1 −ϕ )Q′, they are indifferent between cash
and securities, and so they will be willing to buy any amount of securi-
ties below E/µ. Turning to the supply of securities, if Q < (1 −ϕ )Q′, it
equals total investment minus the capital of the entrepreneurs and the
lenders: WFI − K − D. If Q = (1 −ϕ )Q′, the lender is indifferent between
issuing this amount of securities and any higher amount. Equating demand
and supply for Q < (1 −ϕ )Q′ and substituting for equilibrium wages
from equation 5 gives the first-period securities market equilibrium con-
dition (SM):
In (I, Q) space this deﬁnes a vertical line for Q between zero and (1 −ϕ )Q′.
The expected proﬁts of lenders in the ﬁrst period are Q(1 −ϕ )Iπ(Q′, I) −
WFI + K. There is free entry into this sector, so lenders will enter as long as
there are available projects, and proﬁts are strictly positive. If Q is above a
certain level Q*, then I = 1, and lenders earn positive rents in exchange for
their monitoring services.
19 If Q ≤ Q*, then lenders’ proﬁts are driven to
() 7
1



























136 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Fall 2009
18. The fact that capital gains on a portfolio of securities are always nonnegative is a
consequence of the lack of aggregate uncertainty. It is straightforward to extend the model to
include uncertainty; since all agents are risk-neutral, this would change little in the analysis
after replacing expected for actual values.
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11941-05_Reis_rev2.qxd  1/26/10  11:33 AM  Page 136zero, so Q(1 −ϕ )Iπ(Q′, I) − WFI + K = 0. Solving this equation for I and
replacing for pledgeable proﬁts from equation 6 gives
This is the zero-profits equilibrium condition (ZP), when Q ≤ Q* and
investment is below 1. It defines investment implicitly as an increasing
function of Q. Intuitively, as the price of securities increases, projects
become cheaper to ﬁnance, so the amount of entrepreneurial capital needed
per project falls and more projects are funded.
Turning to the securities market in the second period, if 1 −ϕ< Q′ < 1,
the demand comes solely from traders and equals
Here the first term is the demand from the new capital, and the second is
the extra demand from leveraging capital gains. If Q′=1, the trader is
indifferent between zero and the amount in equation 9. As Q′ falls, the
expected capital gain for traders is smaller, and so they have fewer funds
with which to demand securities. If Q′ falls all the way to 1 −ϕ , then
investors start buying securities directly, satisfying the supply at that price.
The supply of securities comes from lenders who need capital to cover
their outstanding credit lines; thus, it equals (1 −ϕ )IWL′−D′ if Q′ < 1.
Replacing for the equilibrium labor and wage from equations 4 and 5 gives
the supply function for securities in the second period:
This is increasing in Q′, since a higher price of securities implies a lower
marginal cost of production and therefore an increase in the scale of each
firm. This requires more funds to finance operations, and hence higher
credit lines and more securities issued. When Q′=1, the lenders become
indifferent between supplying this and any higher amount.
Equations 7 through 10 provide four conditions to determine the four
endogenous variables: the equilibrium price of securities in the ﬁrst and
second periods (Q and Q′), the amount of investment in the ﬁrst period (I),
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11941-05_Reis_rev2.qxd  1/26/10  11:33 AM  Page 137these deﬁne the equilibrium in this economy.20 There are three possible
equilibria, which I describe next.
II.E. The Three Equilibrium Cases
The ﬁrst case is the efﬁcient economy, where, in spite of the ﬁnancial
frictions, all projects are still funded (I = 1), and ﬁnancing does not add to
the marginal cost of ﬁrms: Q′=1. One can show that this will be the case if
δ, µ, and ϕ are each below some threshold. Intuitively, if δ is not too high,
then the lenders are able to appropriate enough of the entrepreneurs’
revenue so that their proﬁts are high enough and they will wish to ﬁnance
all the projects. If µ is low enough, the friction impeding the ﬂow of funds
from investors to traders is not too severe, and so their funds can satiate
the market for securities. Finally, if ϕ is low enough, the expected proﬁts of
lenders in the ﬁrst period are high, inducing full investment, and investors
put a high lower bound on the price of securities in the second period.
The second case is the other extreme, that of a catastrophic economy,
where the price of securities in the second period has fallen to 1 −ϕ .
Investors start buying securities directly, but because they cannot distin-
guish proﬁtable from unproﬁtable assets, for each dollar they spend on a
worthwhile security, ϕ/(1 −ϕ ) dollars buy a worthless security, squandering
their funds and destroying resources. This low price of securities implies
that the marginal cost of production (1 − v + v/Q′) is high, so that each ﬁrm
will operate at a small, inefﬁcient scale. And as Q falls even lower, below
(1 −ϕ )
2, the cost of ﬁnancing to set up projects in the ﬁrst period becomes
very high, and few ﬁrms are set up in the ﬁrst place.
In between these two extremes is the constrained economy, depicted in
ﬁgure 5. As the left-hand panel of ﬁgure 5 shows, the equilibrium price of
securities and the level of investment in the ﬁrst period are determined,
taking as given the price of securities in the second period. The vertical
line is the SM condition in equation 7, and the upward-sloping curve is the
ZP condition in equation 8. The right-hand panel shows the equilibrium
price in the second period and the scale of the projects, taking as given the
price and investment from the previous period. The zigzag line depicts the
demand function in equation 9, and the curve is the supply function in
equation 10. In this economy there is an extensive-margin inefﬁciency, as
I < 1 in equilibrium. Traders do not have enough assets, because of either
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20. With these four variables determined, equilibrium wages and hours worked are
determined by equations 4 and 5. Equilibrium output and consumption follow from using
the production function and the market clearing condition in the goods market.
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21. One can see that the efﬁcient equilibrium in this graph would require that the SM
line lie to the right of I = 1 so that, in the second period, demand and supply would coincide
over a line segment in the region at the top where they are horizontal. The catastrophic equi-
librium occurs when the supply curve intersects the demand curve in its lower horizontal
segment.
22. One feature of this model, as well as of most models of credit frictions, is that there
is too little borrowing. Some have argued that the current crisis is due rather to too much
borrowing, but to my knowledge this has not yet been formalized.












First period Second period
Source: Author’s model described in the text.
low capital or tight leverage constraints imposed by investors, so the price
of securities Q is below Q*, making the up-front cost of investing too high
relative to future revenue. There is also an intensive-margin inefﬁciency,
since Q′ < 1, and so the marginal costs of production exceed W/a. Operat-
ing ﬁrms will hire too little labor and produce too little output, because
there is too little second-period capital in the hands of traders to satisfy the
lenders’ residual need for funds.
21
Intuitively, for the economy to operate efﬁciently, investors’ capital must
reach entrepreneurs, either directly from lenders or through the securities
market from traders and investors. In the efﬁcient economy, this happens
because entrepreneurs have all the capital they need to set up and operate
projects. In the constrained economy, leverage constraints on traders are
too tight, so that there are insufﬁcient funds in the securities markets in
both periods, and the pledgeability constraint and technological risk prevent
lenders’ capital from being enough. In the catastrophic economy, investors
enter the securities market directly, but do so with great waste since they are
unable to pick securities. There is severe mispricing and misallocation of
capital, as worthless and worthwhile investments face the same marginal
cost of capital in an inefﬁcient pooling equilibrium.
22
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consider what happens in equilibrium as each is shut down. First, if all
projects are productive (ϕ=0), then there is no “lemons” problem in the
securities market. This implies that the knowledge traders use in picking
securities is no longer valuable, and investors can buy securities directly
from lenders. Since there is no limit to the amount of securities that lenders
can issue, and since investors have all the necessary capital to fund all
projects and run them efﬁciently, the only equilibrium is the efﬁcient one.
Second, assume that traders can no longer abscond with capital without
being detected (µ = 0). In this case investors will be willing to invest all
their funds with traders, who in turn will buy all the securities issued by
lenders. Again, the unique equilibrium is the efﬁcient case. Finally, if the
banks have a perfect monitoring technology, they can reap all of the rev-
enue from projects (δ=0). Lenders will then be very willing to lend, a
condition reﬂected in ﬁgure 5 by Q* being quite low, making it more
likely that the efﬁcient equilibrium obtains. It is still possible, however,
that the friction in the leveraging of traders is so strong that they cannot
obtain from investors even the small amount of funds required to fund all
projects, and so the constrained equilibrium persists if the SM line is to
the left of I = 1.
III. Interpreting the Federal Reserve’s Actions: Credit Policy
In terms of the model just described, the ﬁnancial events and crisis described
in section I.A can be interpreted as a combination of two effects. First,
the downgrading of many securities, following downward revisions of the
value of the assets backing them, can be interpreted as an increase in ϕ in
the model. Second, the withdrawal of funds from the ﬁnancial sector and
the fears about the solvency of many ﬁnancial institutions can be interpreted
as an increase in µ. Both of these changes can be interpreted as technolog-
ical changes, or instead as changes in beliefs about the quality of assets.
The economy in 2007–09 can then be seen as moving to a constrained
equilibrium like that depicted in ﬁgure 5, or perhaps even as on the way to
the catastrophic equilibrium.
A policymaker would like to intervene to correct this serious misalloca-
tion of funds. Credit policy in this economy consists of transferring the
capital trapped in investors’ hands to other agents or, alternatively, issuing
more claims on ﬁnal output (and correspondingly taxing more consumption
in the ﬁnal period). What the central bank can achieve with these actions
depends on what is assumed about its knowledge and skills.
140 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Fall 2009
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beyond those available to private investors. In terms of the model, this
translates into the central bank having neither the ability to monitor loans,
nor the know-how to pick securities, nor the power to seize more than a
share of the traders’ assets. In this case any injection of credit by the
central bank in the market is equivalent to an increase in the capital of
investors M. This does not affect any of the equilibrium conditions in the
model, since the problem to be solved is not a lack of funds but their mis-
allocation. Worse, if the central bank misguidedly tries to pick securities,
invest in traders, or make loans directly to entrepreneurs, the model pre-
dicts that its suboptimal behavior will lead to possibly heavy losses, as
money is absconded and investments turn sour.
At the other extreme, consider the case where the central bank can
become a lender, able to monitor the behavior of borrowers and ensure that
the funds it lends are put to good use. Then, by lending the needed funds to
entrepreneurs, the policymaker could reach the social optimum, with no
intervention by ﬁnancial ﬁrms. This seems unrealistic and indeed results in
absurd predictions: if the central bank could lend as effectively as anyone
else, why have a ﬁnancial system at all? Three intermediate cases are both
more interesting and more realistic.
III.A. The Central Bank as a Senior Secure Investor
In the ﬁrst intermediate case, I assume that the central bank has the ability
to make loans to ﬁnancial institutions that are sure to be fully repaid. In the
model this maps into the policymaker both being able to distinguish good
projects from bad and having some monitoring technology that ensures
that lenders repay the central bank out of the revenue from projects before
they or the securities holders get paid. In reality this might be achieved by
imposing the condition that central bank loans are senior to those of other
creditors, or by the central bank using its regulatory power.
In the model a transfer of funds X from the central bank to lenders in the
ﬁrst period raises their initial capital from D to D + X, while leaving their
profits unchanged as X is returned in the final period.
23 Figure 6 depicts
the effect this has on the equilibrium. The SM line in the ﬁrst period shifts
to the right, leading to an increase in investment and a rise in the price of
securities. The extensive margin moves closer to the efﬁcient level. These
changes, in turn, lead to an increase in the supply of securities in the second
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23. This assumes that the central bank is not trying to proﬁt from the loan, so that the net
interest rate it charges is zero.
11941-05_Reis_rev2.qxd  1/26/10  11:33 AM  Page 141period, since I is higher, so that the amount needed for the credit lines rises,
as well as to a decline in demand, since the increase in Q lowers expected
capital gains for traders. Therefore, the price of securities in the second
period unambiguously falls, raising marginal costs and leading to a
worsening of the intensive margin. Second-round effects then follow as
the lower Q′ lowers the expected profits of lenders, shifting the zero-
profit condition to the left and lowering investment, and so on. As a result
of the central bank’s actions, more ﬁrms are in operation, but each at a
smaller, inefﬁcient scale.
For comparison, consider what happens if the ﬁrst-period loans X are
made to traders instead, as also portrayed in ﬁgure 6. Their total assets in
the ﬁrst period increase to E/µ + X, which has exactly the same effect on
the ﬁrst-period equilibrium as the transfer of funds to lenders in the previ-
ous scenario. However, in the second-period market, the increase in the
assets of traders implies that they will have higher capital gains. Because
traders mark their equity to market, they now have an extra source of funds
with which to demand securities in the second period, so that the demand
curve will be to the right of that in the previous case (in the ﬁgure this is
drawn as unchanged from the initial case). Therefore, the price of second-
period securities falls less than it did in that case. This intervention does
not give rise to the same intensive-margin inefﬁciency that the loan to
lenders did.
Alternatively, consider the case where the central bank lends to traders
or lenders in the second period rather than the ﬁrst. Examination of the two
142 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Fall 2009
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Source: Author’s model described in the text.
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symmetrically; it follows that loans to traders and loans to lenders would
have an equivalent effect, raising Q′ and improving intensive-margin efﬁ-
ciency. At the same time, they would lower investment in the ﬁrst period
(see equation 7) and so worsen the extensive margin.
24 Note that the crucial
difference between the ﬁrst and the second periods in the model is whether
the securities are coming due next period or not. The indifference between
lending funds to traders and lending them to lenders applies only to the
securities that are about to mature; for all other securities, loans to traders
are more effective because they affect the traders’ equity and leverage in
future periods.
The theory therefore suggests that providing funds to traders of new
securities is more effective than providing them to lenders. The intuition is
that, by accruing capital gains, traders can use increases in their equity to
raise their leverage and draw more of the plentiful funds in the hands of
investors to where they are needed in the securities markets. For the Federal
Reserve, however, it is more natural to extend loans to commercial banks,
as this involves little departure from its usual procedures. The creation of
the popular 90-day loans under the TAF, which banks can use instead of
the overnight loans available in the federal funds market, is an example
of directing funds to lenders. Programs such as the TSLF, the PDCF, and
the TALF are closer to the injection of funds into traders that the model
recommends.
III.B. The Central Bank as a Buyer of Securities
Next, consider the stricter case where the central bank has the know-
how to evaluate securities in the second period, distinguishing those that
are associated with proﬁtable ﬁrms from those that are worthless. In this case
the central bank can use its funds X to buy securities directly, shifting the
demand curve in the right-hand panel of ﬁgure 5 to the right. In the model
this is precisely equivalent to lending funds to traders or lenders in the sec-
ond period, as was just discussed. It is less effective than lending to traders
in the ﬁrst period because it does not draw investors’ funds into the market.
The Federal Reserve followed this path during the latter part of 2008
through the CPFF. This agrees with the model’s prescriptions, since it
has the same effect on the equilibrium as loans to traders, but the latter in
RICARDO REIS 143
24. Leaving the constrained equilibrium and reaching the efﬁcient one would require
large loans in either or both periods. If that is not possible, then a well-calibrated increase in
the funds available to traders in both periods could simultaneously improve both extensive-
and intensive-margin efﬁciency.
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once the central bank starts picking which securities to buy, it opens itself
to political and lobbying pressures that may prove dangerous.
III.C. The Central Bank as an Equity Investor
Through its public-private partnerships and its capital stakes in banks,
the Treasury has become an equity holder in many ﬁnancial ﬁrms. The
Federal Reserve has not done so explicitly, although its uncomfortable
actions in support of the rescue of Bear Stearns and AIG make it close to
being a de facto investor.
25
In terms of the model, this case differs from the previous one because
the purchases of securities by the traders increase not by X but rather by X/µ.
That is, with the central bank now taking an equity stake, the new funds can
be leveraged up, drawing more capital from investors into the securities
market. In terms of the model, this is unambiguously better than provid-
ing loans, but only if the central bank can prevent its new partners from
absconding with a share µ of the assets.
26 Moreover, in real life it requires
that the government behave like a proﬁt-maximizing shareholder in the ﬁrms.
Both conditions may not be met, and both surely come with some risk.
IV. Interpreting the Federal Reserve’s Actions: 
Quantitative Policy
The large increase in outstanding reserves and in the size of the Federal
Reserve’s balance sheet can cause worries. If “inflation is always and
everywhere a monetary phenomenon,” as in Milton Friedman’s famous
dictum, then the creation of so much money in the past two years might
indicate that inﬂation is to come.
However, there are good reasons, both empirical and theoretical, to be
skeptical of the tight link between money and inﬂation that a strict mone-
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25. The Federal Reserve’s discomfort with these actions is clear in Chairman Bernanke’s
speech of April 3, 2009, cited above: “[The purchases covered by Maiden LLC] are very
different than the other liquidity programs discussed previously and were put in place to
avoid major disruptions in financial markets. From a credit perspective, these support
facilities carry more risk than traditional central bank liquidity support, but we nevertheless
expect to be fully repaid....  These operations have been extremely uncomfortable for the
Federal Reserve to undertake and were carried out only because no reasonable alternative
was available.”
26. In reality, agents receiving the funds need not literally abscond with them. They may
instead pick dishonest partners, exert too little effort, or divert company investments toward
private gains.
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States and the United Kingdom in the early 1980s were a failure, and even
though Japan in the 1990s increased reserves on a scale similar to that in
the United States recently, deflation persisted. Conventional models of
inﬂation predict that reserves are irrelevant for the setting of interest rates or
the control of inﬂation.
27 This section discusses these theoretical arguments
and examines to what extent the crisis may require their modiﬁcation.
IV.A. A Simple Model of Price-Level Determination
Consider the following model of price-level (Pt) determination with no
uncertainty:
Equation 11 is the Euler equation for consumption, which equates the real
interest rate (the gross nominal rate 1 + it divided by gross inﬂation Pt+1/Pt)
to the discounted change in the marginal utility of consumption, which
with log utility equals consumption growth. Equation 12 is the demand
for real reserves (Mt/Pt). It depends negatively on the opportunity cost
of holding reserves instead of bonds, which is the difference in the interest
rates paid on the two assets (it − it
m). When this difference is zero and the
other determinants of the demand for reserves are held ﬁxed, the private
sector is indifferent toward holding any amount of reserves above some
satiation level.
28
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27. See Woodford (2008), among many others.
28. One assumption implicit in these two equations is that real money balances do not
affect the marginal utility of consumption. Although deviations from this strict separability
assumption can have strong theoretical implications for monetary policy (Reis 2007), empir-
ically the deviations seem small (see section 3.4 in Woodford 2003).
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is the government budget constraint. On the left-hand side are govern-
ment spending (Gt) and interest payments on outstanding bonds (Bt). On
the right-hand side are revenue from taxes (Tt), transfers from the Federal
Reserve (Vt), and issuances of new debt. Equation 14 is the market clearing
condition for government debt, which may be held either by the Federal
Reserve (Bt
F) or by private agents (Bt
P).
The final two equations apply to the central bank. It makes transfers
to the Treasury, pays interest on reserves, and buys either government
securities or private assets (Kt). These uses of funds are ﬁnanced by issuing
new reserves and by the interest collected on the government bonds and on
the portfolio of private securities with return qt. The last equation is the
policy rule for the interest rate, with χ > 1 and policy choices xt.29
To focus on the price level, I take consumption as exogenous, and to
focus on monetary policy, I treat government spending as also exogenous.
The Federal Reserve’s policy is captured by its interest rate policy (its choices
of interest rates {xt, it, it
m}), its quantitative policy (its choices regarding the
amount of reserves and transfers to the Treasury {Mt, Vt}), and its credit
policy (its choices regarding what assets {Bt
F, Kt} to hold). The Treasury’s
policy is captured by its choices regarding taxation and debt issuance
{Tt, Bt}.30 The goal is to determine the price level Pt as a function of these
nine policy variables, subject to the six equations above and a set of initial
and terminal conditions.
31 A policy regime can be deﬁned as a choice of
which of these policy variables will be exogenously chosen and which must
be accommodated endogenously.
IV.B. The Precrisis Policy Regime
For most of the last 20 years, the press releases and commentary 
following meetings of the FOMC have focused on the current choice of
innovations to the short-term interest rate xt, and its likely future path.
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29. Adding a real activity variable to bring this rule close to a Taylor rule would change
nothing in the analysis.
30. In the world outside the model, this sharp distinction between ﬁscal and monetary
policy has become blurred by the recent cooperation between the Federal Reserve and the
Treasury in addressing the crisis.
31. The initial conditions are Mt−1, BF
t−1, Bt−1, Kt−1, and the terminal conditions come from




t+j/Pt+j = 0 and limj→∞β
ju′(Ct+j)Mt+j/Pt+j = 0.
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solution for the price level is
Regardless of any other policy choice, interest rate policy alone determines
inﬂation. As long as the other policy choices respect the constraints imposed
by the equilibrium in equations 11 through 16, understanding and forecast-
ing inﬂation involves focusing solely on the target rates announced by the
FOMC. However the other variables are determined, it is the federal funds
rate that determines inﬂation, according to the model.
Turning to the other variables, the policy rule in equation 16 determines
endogenously the observed short-term interest rate it. The other exogenous
interest rate is it
m, the interest rate on reserves, which before October 2008
was zero. The money demand equation (equation 12) then implied that
total reserves Mt were determined endogenously. Therefore, there was no
independent quantitative policy, as the size of the Federal Reserve’s balance
sheet had to accommodate the ﬂuctuations in the demand for reserves.
As for credit policy, before 2007 the Federal Reserve chose to hold
almost no private securities (Kt ≈ 0) and to hold government bonds roughly
in line with the amount of reserves in circulation (Bt
F≈ Mt). The Federal
Reserve’s budget constraint, equation 15, reduces to
in steady state. With these policy choices, the Federal Reserve obtained net
income from seigniorage every period, rebating almost all of it to the Trea-
sury to keep its accounting capital roughly constant.
Finally, turning to fiscal policy, combining the result in equation 18
with the Treasury’s budget constraint in equation 13, the market clear-
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temporal solvency constraint in equation 20, and the total outstanding U.S.
debt evolves endogenously to satisfy equation 19.
Monetary policy has been independent of ﬁscal policy in that the Federal
Reserve chooses xt taking only its mandate into account, regardless of the
ﬁscal choices of the Treasury. Fiscal policy is dependent on monetary policy
insofar as changes in reserves will affect the flow of seigniorage to the
Treasury, but since the term ΔMt+j has in the history of the Federal Reserve
been tiny relative to the government’s operating balance Pt+j(Tt+j − Gt+j),
this dependence has been close to irrelevant.
Until recently, both the independence of the central bank to set interest
rates and control inﬂation and the accommodation of reserves to interest
rate policy were seen as hallmarks of good monetary policy.
32 Some have
even argued that this policy regime partly explains the decline in macro-
economic volatility in the two decades before the crisis.
33
IV.C. Is the Pre-2007 Status Quo Sustainable?
The crisis has brought significant changes in monetary policy. How-
ever, these by themselves do not imply that the determination of the
price level must be different from what was just described. According to
the model, monetary policy can still independently choose the path for
interest rates {xt}, and this alone still suffices to determine current and
future inflation.
The changes in policy only have to affect variables in the system other
than inﬂation. First, because it can now pay interest on reserves, the central
bank can choose exogenously either it − it
m or the quantity of reserves Mt.
Unlike before, when the interest rate on reserves was fixed at zero, the
central bank may now wish to set a target for the amount of reserves in
the market, as long as it adjusts it
m accordingly. Moreover, if it continues
the current policy of setting it
m = it, the central bank can also target any level
of reserves above the satiation level (Mt/Pt)*. This policy has at least two
virtues. First, it allows the central bank to inject as much liquidity as nec-
essary to sustain the efﬁcient equilibrium described in the previous section.
Second, it eliminates the implicit tax on reserves that existed before 2008
and that Friedman (1960, 1969) and Marvin Goodfriend (2002), among
many others, had criticized well before the crisis for being inefﬁcient.
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32. See Woodford (2003) and Mishkin (2007).
33. See, for instance, Chairman Bernanke’s speech on “The Great Moderation,” deliv-
ered at the Eastern Economic Association, Washington, February 20, 2004.
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ings of private securities, receiving in return government bonds until these
are again approximately equal to reserves. The only substantial change is
that now, with the removal of the implicit tax on reserves, transfers to the
Treasury become zero. Since they were small to start with, this should
have no visible effect on government ﬁnances and ﬁscal policy. The balance
sheet of the Federal Reserve can stay larger than before, with reserves beyond
the satiation level at whatever amount is supplied.
The announced intentions of the Federal Reserve are roughly consistent
with the scenario just described. The Federal Reserve has been ﬁrm in its
commitment to set interest rates so as to control inﬂation and to maintain
its independence.
34 Moreover, there is no indication that the decision to
pay interest on reserves will be reversed. The Federal Reserve has also
indicated that it would like to lower its holdings of private securities to as
close to zero as possible as soon as it can.
35
One source of uncertainty is what the Federal Reserve will do about
quantitative policy in the aftermath of the crisis. The Federal Reserve has
indicated that once it becomes possible, it will lower reserves and reduce
the size of its balance sheet.
36 The theory in this and the previous sections
suggests that this is unnecessary, as there is nothing wrong with keeping
reserves at high levels. Importantly, this much higher level of reserves is
RICARDO REIS 149
34. From the joint statement of the Federal Reserve and the Treasury on March 23,
2009: “The Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) determines monetary conditions 
in the United States, subject to its congressional mandate to foster maximum sustainable
employment and stable prices. The Federal Reserve’s independence with regard to monetary
policy is critical for ensuring that monetary policy decisions are made with regard only to
the long-term economic welfare of the nation.” From the same statement: “Actions that the
Federal Reserve takes, during this period of unusual and exigent circumstances, in the pur-
suit of ﬁnancial stability, such as loans or securities purchases that inﬂuence the size of its
balance sheet, must not constrain the exercise of monetary policy as needed to foster maxi-
mum sustainable employment and price stability.”
35. As Vice Chairman Kohn put it in a speech in May 2009, “An important issue with
our nontraditional policies is the transition back to a more normal stance and operations of
monetary policy as ﬁnancial conditions improve and economic activity picks up enough to
increase resource utilization. These actions will be critical to ensuring price stability as the
real economy returns to normal” (“Interactions between Monetary and Fiscal Policy in the
Current Situation,” speech delivered at Princeton University, May 23, 2009).
36. As Chairman Bernanke stated in his April 3 speech, cited above, “We have a number
of tools we can use to reduce bank reserves or increase short-term interest rates when that
becomes necessary. . . . Many of our lending programs extend credit primarily on a short-term
basis and thus could be wound down relatively quickly. . . . The Federal Reserve can conduct
reverse repurchase agreements against its long-term securities holdings to drain bank reserves
or, if necessary, it could choose to sell some of its securities.”
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reserves, eliminating the implicit tax on reserves, the old money multiplier
that linked reserves to the price level broke down.
IV.D. The Capital and Fiscal Risks to the Status Quo
The main risk to the scenario just described comes from the Federal
Reserve’s ﬂow of funds in equation 13. Now that interest is being paid on
reserves, and now that reserves have more than doubled, the term i
m
t−1Mt−1
can become signiﬁcant as soon as i
m
t−1 increases from zero in tandem with
the federal funds rate. Moreover, with the Federal Reserve holding a sig-
niﬁcant amount of private securities, the return on these securities may
prove negative, lowering revenue by the amount qt−1Kt−1.
37 How can the
Federal Reserve make up for this budget shortfall?
There are two separate issues, one real and one illusory. To start with
the latter, if the Federal Reserve suffers signiﬁcant losses on its portfolio,
its accounting capital may become negative. If the Federal Reserve were
an ordinary company, this would mean that it was bankrupt, as its liabil-
ities would exceed its assets. However, the Federal Reserve is not an
ordinary company, because its liabilities are special. Negative capital is a
problem for an ordinary company because it lacks the assets to pay its
creditors if they all demand to be paid at once. But the Federal Reserve’s
two main creditors are currency holders and banks holding reserves.
Neither can show up at the central bank and demand to be paid with assets.
Currency issued by the Federal Reserve is legal tender, and the holding of
reserves can be required by law. This means that there cannot be a run of
creditors on the Federal Reserve. Thus, the accounting capital of the Fed-
eral Reserve is a vacuous concept. If there is a concern, it is because, as
Tiago Berriel and Saroj Bhattarai (2009) document, most central banks,
including the Federal Reserve, seem to worry about their capital. As those
authors show, if the central bank worries about trying to maintain a target
level of capital in its balance sheet, this will move the path of interest rates
away from what would be desirable.
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37. The Federal Reserve has repeatedly stated that it believes the risk of losses is mini-
mal (see, for example, Chairman Bernanke’s Stamp Lecture at the London School of Eco-
nomics, “The Crisis and the Policy Response,” January 13, 2009), because in most of its
programs it is taking triple-A-rated securities as collateral and imposing signiﬁcant hair-
cuts. There is reason to be a little skeptical, however. First, if the investments were riskless,
one would expect that private investors would not be so reluctant to make them. Second,
there is a certain irony in appealing to the high ratings of the collateral when the ﬁnancial
crisis has been marked by suspicions about the value of collateral and the reliability of rat-
ings agencies.
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eral Reserve, like any other agent, has a budget constraint. Rearranging
equation 13,
The issue is that the left-hand side may become large, requiring additional
funds on the right-hand side to maintain equality. The ﬁve terms on the right-
hand side give the ﬁve possible sources of these funds. The ﬁrst of these is the
interest collected on the government bonds the central bank holds. Because
it−1 ≥ im
t−1, any budget shortfall that arises from paying interest on reserves is
at most equal to the interest rate times the difference between reserves
outstanding and government securities held. The Federal Reserve’s balance
sheet on August 19, 2009, reported in table 1, shows that at that date, even if
the annual interest rate were as high as 5 percent, this would amount to just
over $10 billion a year.
38 If the Federal Reserve exchanges a few of its private
assets for government securities, as it already plans to do by the end of 2009,
it can reach the normal state where Bt
F > Mt and the interest on reserves is
more than covered by the interest received on government securities.
The danger therefore comes almost entirely from the possibility of large
losses on the central bank’s holdings of private assets. The second and
third terms on the right-hand side of equation 21 show that the Federal
Reserve can sell its assets—either the government securities or the private
assets—to cover these losses. This cannot go on forever, as the Federal
Reserve will eventually run out of assets. But considering the over $2 tril-
lion in assets that the Federal Reserve holds, this would require quite cata-
strophic losses for a sustained period.
39
Another option is to print money or raise reserves, raising Mt. If the
economy is already satiated with reserves, this extra printing of money will
have no effect on the macroeconomy, as banks will be happy to accept these
extra reserves as payment. There is no private or social cost to creating
excess and possibly idle reserves.
40
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38. This is calculated by multiplying 0.05 by the sum of bank reserves plus Treasury
deposits minus securities held outright. This maps onto the worst-case scenario, where the
Treasury closes its deposit account with the Federal Reserve, demanding that its $240.2 bil-
lion in bonds be given back. Excluding this possibility, then already Bt
F > Mt.
39. Stella (2009, table 9) tries to quantify this risk and arrives at a worst-case scenario of
losses of $78 billion on the existing assets.
40. Note that this option relies on the existence of a ﬁnite satiation level in the demand
for reserves, beyond which people are indifferent about the real money balances they hold.
Otherwise, printing money would compromise the Federal Reserve’s target for inﬂation.
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the Federal Reserve might choose to rely on a steady stream of financ-
ing from the Treasury (Vt < 0). The financial independence of the Federal
Reserve from Congress has been a guarantee of its overall independence.
41
Should transfers from the taxpayer to the Federal Reserve, requiring 
the approval of Congress, become a regular occurrence, political pres-
sures on the setting of interest rates would become inevitable. There is a
real danger that this would lead to permanent increases in inflation in
exchange for only short-lived boosts to output, as the U.S. economy falls
into the time-inconsistency trap described by Finn Kydland and Edward
Prescott (1977).
In the extreme, this loss of independence could even trigger a change in
the policy regime. In particular, consider the scenario where Congress
limits the ﬁscal plans of the executive branch by imposing a target for gov-
ernment debt as a ratio to GDP (or consumption): Bt/Ct. The Treasury could
accommodate this target by cutting deﬁcits. But it might instead choose a
value for nominal deﬁcits exogenously, consistent with an equilibrium.
42
The equilibrium price level would be
and inﬂation would be determined solely by the government’s ﬁscal choices.
The Federal Reserve would then be forced to accommodate these ﬁscal
policies by effectively handing over control of nominal interest rates, with xt
determined endogenously to satisfy
This ﬁscalist determination of inﬂation requires the Treasury to be domi-
nant over the Federal Reserve in setting policy—a situation that the litera-
ture has described as the ﬁscal authorities being active and the central bank
passive.
43
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41. Indeed, conventional measures of central bank independence typically consider bud-
getary independence from the legislative bodies a prerequisite (see the recent survey in
Cukierman 2008).
42. This mechanism is described in Sims (1994) and Woodford (1995) and is discussed
and criticized in Canzoneri, Cumby, and Diba (2001) and Bassetto (2008).
43. For further exploration of the implications of this ﬁscal theory of the price level
within the context of the current crisis, see Sims (2009) and Cochrane (2009).
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Interest Rate Policy
A key feature of the crisis of 2007–09 is that short-term interest rates have
been almost zero. This is only the second time that this has happened in the
last century in the United States, the other being the period of the Great
Depression in the 1930s. Many economists refer to this situation as a
“liquidity trap,” since zero is the lowest possible target for the federal funds
rate, and transitory increases in the money supply lead investors, now
indifferent between money and bonds, to simply substitute one for the other.
Conventional monetary policy appears powerless.
An extensive literature argues that this appearance is incorrect. Motivated
by the experience of Japan in the 1990s, researchers over the past decade
have characterized the challenges in a liquidity trap and offered some policy
advice to confront them.
44 They argue that in a liquidity trap, not only is
interest rate policy not ineffective, but indeed choosing the right path
for interest rates becomes particularly important.
To understand this point, recall the Fisher equation equating the real
interest rate, rt, to the nominal interest rate, it, minus expected inflation,
Et(Δ Pt+1):
Recall further that the (linearized) Euler equation with log utility for opti-
mal consumption states that expected consumption growth between date t
and date t + s is equal to the sum of short-term real interest rates across the
two periods:
Intuitively, the higher the long-term real interest rate, which is equal to
the expected path of short-term real interest rates, the greater the incen-
tive to save, postponing consumption today for consumption in the
future.
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44. This work, in turn, builds on earlier analyses of monetary policy during the Great
Depression. Romer (1992), in particular, makes a compelling case for the powerful role of
monetary policy in ending the Depression.
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spillover to the real economy have led to a fall in the real interest rate needed
for the economy to respond efficiently. If inflation expectations remain
stable and low, equation 24 may imply that the nominal interest rate would
have to become negative to generate the needed real interest rate. But
because the nominal interest rate has a zero lower bound, this cannot happen,
and consequently real interest rates remain too high.
45 Equation 25 then
implies that these excessively high real interest rates drive down current
consumption, worsening the recession.
The “Brookings answer” to this problem was given in two papers
published in this journal. First, Paul Krugman (1998) emphasized that
monetary policy is particularly potent in this situation if it can steer inﬂation
expectations. The way out of the trap is to raise inﬂation expectations by
whatever means possible, so that the short-term real interest rate can fall,
encouraging consumption. Then, Gauti Eggertsson and Michael Woodford
(2003) identified a practical way for the central bank to affect inflation
expectations, by committing to keep nominal interest rates low into the
future, even after the shocks leading to the crisis have subsided. This would
lower expected future short-term real interest rates, producing the fall in
long-term real interest rates needed to drive real activity up.
There are several other ways to raise inﬂation expectations, bring down
real interest rates, and stimulate the economy. Devaluing the currency is
one, and another is to purchase government debt with a permanent increase
in the money supply that is allowed to persist after the crisis has passed. A
more institutional approach that would prevent the problem from appearing
in the ﬁrst place would be for the central bank to announce a price-level
target, since this would require that current deﬂation be offset by higher
future inﬂation to get back on target. A ﬁnal alternative would be for the
central bank to commit to lower long-term nominal interest rates, as this
would be equivalent to committing to a lower path of short-term rates.
46 It
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45. The nominal interest rate on any safe security cannot be negative, because selling
this security short and keeping the proceeds as cash until the security matures would result in
positive proﬁts and create an arbitrage opportunity. This is only approximately correct since
the expected return on money is not exactly zero but slightly negative, as deposit accounts
pay fees, and cash held in one’s pocket may be stolen. Nevertheless, it is likely very close to
zero. Goodfriend (2000) and Buiter and Panigirtzoglou (2003) have revived an old proposal
by Silvio Gesell for the government to tax money, effectively removing the lower bound on
interest rates and therefore eliminating the possibility of liquidity traps.
46. On exchange rate policy see Svensson (2003), on debt purchases see Auerbach and
Obstfeld (2005), on price-level targeting see Eggertsson and Woodford (2003), and on low-
ering long-term interest rates see Bernanke (2002).
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expectations by committing to low nominal interest rates into the future.
Rather, they are different ways to implement the same policy, namely, a
decrease in the real interest rate, through its relationship with other macro-
economic variables.
How do the Federal Reserve’s actions compare with these theoretical
suggestions? Although the Federal Reserve has not announced a com-
mitment to allow higher inflation than average in the near future, in the
way that a price-level target would suggest, it has announced its com-
mitment to do what it can to prevent deﬂation. The FOMC announcements
following every meeting so far in 2009 have stated the intention to 
keep the target for the federal funds rate at zero for an extended period.
These are signs that the advice of Krugman, Eggertsson, and Woodford
is being followed, but only halfway, as the Federal Reserve has also 
signaled that it will not tolerate either temporary or permanent above-
normal inflation.
47
Meanwhile the Federal Reserve has made no commitment to any of the
other alternatives. First, announcing a devaluation of the dollar is not an
option, since this is the domain of the Treasury, not the Federal Reserve.
Second, there has been little purchasing of government debt: the dollar
value of Treasury-issued securities plus agency debt held by the Federal
Reserve in August 2009, at $847.9 billion, was not dramatically greater than
the $778.9 billion it held in January 2007. Although the Federal Reserve
has announced that it will expand its purchases of government bonds sub-
stantially in the coming months, it has also indicated that this might be
temporary, as it returns to a balance sheet similar in size to that in the past
once the crisis subsides. Third, the change in the maturity composition of
these securities toward longer-term bonds is consistent with an effort to
lower long-term interest rates, but there is little evidence that this portfolio
shift can have any effect beyond what the announcement of lower future
short-term interest rates will achieve.
A crucial part of the Federal Reserve’s policy is its future actions, after
the crisis subsides, and these remain to be seen. In particular, the FOMC
has not clearly stated that it will keep interest rates at zero even after 
the ﬁnancial shock disappears, an important component of optimal policy
according to the theory just discussed.
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47. This was clearly stated by Vice Chairman Kohn on October 9, 2009.
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This paper has provided a critical analysis of the Federal Reserve’s policy
actions of the past two years. It has catalogued monetary policy into three
types according to whether it affects interest rates, the size of the Federal
Reserve’s balance sheet, or the allocation of its credit across different assets.
With regard to interest rate policy, the Federal Reserve has followed the
advice derived from theory by committing to fight deflation and to keep
nominal interest rates at zero for the foreseeable future. It has deviated
from the theoretical recommendations by not committing to higher-than-
average inﬂation in the future, and especially by not providing a clear signal
that it will keep nominal interest rates low for some time even after the
crisis is over.
With regard to quantitative policy, at least theoretically there is no
reason why the path of short-term nominal interest rates should cease to
determine inﬂation, or why the conventional separation between monetary
and ﬁscal policy should have to be revisited. Both of these features have
been lauded as hallmarks of the success of monetary policy in the past
two decades. However, the combination of an expansion in the Federal
Reserve’s balance sheet, the introduction of interest payments on reserves,
and the holding by the Federal Reserve of assets with risky returns does
pose a danger. The Federal Reserve might face signiﬁcant budget short-
falls, and overreacting to these may lead to the central bank surrendering
its independence from ﬁscal policy, potentially compromising both of the
hallmarks above.
Finally, regarding credit policy, the paper has introduced a new model
of how the ﬁnancial market allocates funds to investment and of the credit
frictions in that process. I have considered the merits of different inter-
ventions as indicated by the model, conditioned on alternative beliefs about
the knowledge and power of the Federal Reserve. The model suggests that
using senior loans to inject funds into ﬁrms that trade asset-backed securities
is an effective way to intervene in the ﬁnancial markets. Theoretically, this
seems superior to lending funds to the originators of loans, and superior
to buying securities directly, and perhaps superior even to taking equity
stakes in ﬁnancial ﬁrms. The Federal Reserve’s actions over the past two
years have included almost all of these alternatives. Perhaps this was wise,
since so little is known in this area. What is more likely is that looking
back in a few years and using either the model in this paper or others that
will follow, some of the Federal Reserve’s credit policies will be seen as
ineffective or even harmful.
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policies, I have not addressed every facet of the crisis or of the role of mon-
etary policy during a crisis. For example, I have considered neither aggre-
gate risk and changes in risk spreads nor the potential for bank runs.
48 Nor
have I discussed the role of foreign investors and the external deﬁcit, or
compared the Federal Reserve’s actions with those of other central banks
around the world. Finally, I have not emphasized the political economy
trade-offs that the different policies involve, which may become important
in the near future.
This interpretation of the Federal Reserve’s actions has thus enjoyed the
privileges of being selective in the choice of topics and of having some
hindsight in addressing them. Neither was available to the Federal Reserve
and other central banks in the past two years. Moreover, as is almost always
the case when an academic writes about policy, the tone and spirit of this
interpretation are based implicitly on the premise that theory runs ahead of
practice. The events of the past two years have been humbling on that score,
providing a lesson to academics like me that we must be less conﬁdent
about this premise than usual.
APPENDIX
Details of the Model
This appendix complements the setup and solution of the model described
in the text.
The Problem of the Representative Consumer-Worker
The consumer-worker in the model faces the following optimization
problem:
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48. On risk spreads, see Cúrdia and Woodford (2009), and on bank runs, see Allen, Babus,
and Carletti (2009).
11941-05_Reis_rev2.qxd  1/26/10  11:33 AM  Page 157Expression A.1 gives the consumer-worker’s preferences. Utility is loga-
rithmic in total consumption and linear in labor supplied; these functional
forms make the algebra easier.
Equation A.2 is the budget constraint. On the left-hand side are the uses
of funds in the third period, namely, to purchase the consumption good
from the ﬁrms and to pay taxes H″. On the right-hand side are the sources
of the funds: wages received from labor and income received (“payoff”)
from the four ﬁnancial participants in the last period. Because utility is linear
in labor supply in all three periods, there is a single wage. Since capital is
transferred across periods at zero net return, this is the single intertemporal
budget constraint.
Finally, equation A.3 is the Dixit-Stiglitz aggregator mapping the con-
sumption of different varieties onto the ﬁnal composite goods, with elasticity
of substitution m/(m − 1).
The optimality conditions are
The Problem of Agents in the Financial Market
Investors start in period 1 with capital M. Their budget constraints for each
period are
In words, in the ﬁrst period they invest Inv in traders and keep Ht in capital.
In the second period they invest an additional Inv′, buy securities in
amount Sec′, and keep the remainder H′ 1 in capital. In the third period they
receive back their previous investments from traders at zero net return and
receive the payoff of the 1 −ϕsecurities they bought in the previous period
that were productive, ending with total capital H" 1.
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(summed over all entrepreneurs) in each period is
In the ﬁrst period entrepreneurs use their own capital and the loans from
lenders to pay their ﬁxed costs, with HE left over. In the second period they
have this capital plus new loans, which they spend on the operating costs
of their ﬁrms, leaving H′ E for the next period. Finally, in the last period,
they receive the share δ of revenue and end with total capital H" E.
The budget constraints of the lending sector in the aggregate in each
period are
In the ﬁrst period lenders start with capital D and obtain extra capital S by
selling securities. They use this to make loans and retain a nonnegative
amount of capital HL. In the next period they receive new capital, sell new
securities to traders and investors, and can use this and the capital saved
from the last period to increase their lending, through the credit lines
extended to the entrepreneurs, while potentially holding some capital for
the following period. Finally, in the last period, they receive a share 1 −δ
of the ﬁrms’ revenue and must pay back the holders of securities backed by
the loans to the surviving ﬁrms.
Finally, the aggregate budget constraints of the traders in each period are
(. ) . A1 8 1 Inv Inv HS Q S Q T + ′ + ′′ =− ( ) + ′′ ϕ
(. ) A1 7 ′ + ′ = ′ + ′ SH EI nv T
(. ) A1 6 SH EI nv T += +
(. ) A1 5 1 1
1
− ( ) + ′′ +− ( ) ′′ + ′′ =
− ( ) ′
ϕϕ
δ
S Q S Q Sec Q H
N
L
′′ ′ ′ + ′ PY H L.
(. ) A1 4 Loan H D SS e cH LL ′ + ′ = ′ + ′ + ′ +
(. ) A1 3 Loan H D S L += +
(. ) . A1 2 W L NH P Y NH EE ′′ + ′′ = ′′ ′′ + ′ δ
(.) A1 1 WL N H Loan H EE ′ + ′ = ′ +
(. ) A1 0 WFI H K Loan E += +
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starting funds E plus Inv received from investors. The same applies in the
second period. In the third period the investments are repaid at zero net
cost, and the securities earn a nonzero return. The pledgeability constraints
on investment are
The second term in the pledgeability constraint in the second period is the
capital gain on the securities bought in the previous period. The possible
absconding of traders with the assets is not included in these constraints,
because this never happens in equilibrium.
The capital holdings for all agents are nonnegative: HI, HI′, H″ I, HE, HE ′,
HE ″, HL, HL′, HL″, HT, HT′, HT ″ are all greater than or equal to zero.
Optimality Conditions for Financial Agents
Each of the risk-neutral ﬁnancial agents wants to maximize its ﬁnal capital.
I focus here on the case where, in equilibrium, there is some inefﬁciency,
so Q < 1 −ϕ , and Q′ < 1. The other cases are similar.
Investors want to maximize HI″. As long as Q′ < 1 −ϕ , they will buy no
securities, Sec′=0, since doing so leads to a negative return. Moreover,
they are indifferent between holding capital and placing it with traders, and
I assume that they invest as much as they can, subject to the pledgeability
constraint.
Entrepreneurs earn strictly positive proﬁts. Therefore, the return from
applying their capital in the firm exceeds that from keeping it idle, and
HE = H′ E = 0. The optimal number of projects started and the optimal amount
of labor hired are determined in section II.C.
Lenders are willing to sell securities at a positive return to traders, and
therefore they must not be holding capital at zero return, so HL = H′ L = 0.
The optimal choice of Loan and Loan′ was determined in section II.C,
and the optimal issues of S and S′ were stated in section II.D and derive
from the budget constraints.
Traders earn a positive net return on the securities. Since capital earns a
zero return, they choose HT = H′ T = 0. Since they pay zero return to
investors, they will want to draw funds from them to the extent possible.
The pledgeability constraints therefore hold with equality. Combining the
(. ) . A2 0 1 1 Inv SQ Q S Q ′ ≤− ( ) ′ +− ( ) ′ − [] {} μϕ
(. ) A1 9 1 Inv S ≤− ( ) μ
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text, S = E/µ and S′=E′/µ + [(1 − µ)/µ][(1 −ϕ )Q′/Q − 1]E/µ.
Market Clearing Conditions and Walras’s Law
I start by summing the budget constraints for the four financial agents,
to obtain the market clearing conditions for capital within the financial
market. This gives
The ﬁrst two conditions determine the capital left over with investors at the
end of the ﬁrst two periods. They show that as long as M is large enough,
HI > 0 and H′ I > 0, an assumption that I maintain throughout the analysis.
This in turn translates into an assumption for total initial capital, since the
market clearing condition for capital between the representative household
and ﬁnancial institutions in the ﬁrst period is
The payoff from ﬁnancial ﬁrms to households in the last period is
where the second equation comes from the market clearing condition for
capital in the third period, and the third from using the market clearing
conditions in the other periods. Noting that market clearing in the goods
market implies that ∫
N
0 Pi″Ci″di = P″Y″N, and therefore this last expression
can be rewritten as
(. ) . A2 8
0 ′′ ′′ += +′ + ′′ + P C di H WFI WL N WL N Payoff ii
N
∫ ∫
(. ) , A2 7 = ′′ ′′ − ′′ − ′ −+ P Y NW L NW L NW F IH
(. ) A2 6 = ′′ ′′ − ′′ + ′ PYN W LN H I
(. ) A2 5 Payoff H H H H IE B L = ′′ + ′′ + ′′ + ′′
(. ) . A2 4 HMKDD EE = +++ ′ ++ ′
(. ) A2 3 ′′+ ′′ + ′′ + ′′ = ′′ ′′ − ′′ + ′ HHHH N P Y N W LH IELT I ..
(. ) A2 2 ′ =+ ′ + ′ − ′ HHD EW L N II
(.) A2 1 HM K D EW F I I = +++−
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and L"N = L
S", this expression becomes the budget constraint of the repre-
sentative consumer. This veriﬁes Walras’s law and conﬁrms that all funds
have been accounted for.
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Comments and Discussion
COMMENT BY
TIMOTHY BESLEY The past two years have seen central banks respond
with unprecedented aggressiveness to the consequences of the global down-
turn. Following the collapse of Lehman Brothers in September 2008, interest
rates were eventually cut to their effective lower bound by a number of cen-
tral banks, including the Federal Reserve. Many central banks have now
engaged in a variety of unconventional policy measures to increase the
degree of monetary stimulus and to improve the operation of ﬁnancial mar-
kets, particularly credit markets. These have involved a variety of actions
that often fall collectively under the heading of “quantitative easing,”
although as Ricardo Reis notes in his paper, there are conceptually distinct
components to the Federal Reserve’s strategy.
There has been much in this episode to challenge practitioners and stu-
dents of monetary policy. In his paper Reis sets out to provide a framework
for thinking through the theoretical motivation for the Federal Reserve’s
actions. While focusing on the U.S. experience, he touches on issues of
more general importance for academics and policymakers. And to some
degree the issues that he discusses have been on the mind of many central
bankers the world over. I come at this through the lens of my own experi-
ence as a member of the Bank of England’s Monetary Policy Committee
between 2006 and 2009.
The context of recent events is important for understanding the bigger
picture. The period known as the Great Moderation had encouraged a view
that the science of monetary policy and its practical implementation had
reached maturity. Reﬂecting this, central banks were more or less univer-
sally charged with ensuring price stability and had enjoyed a good measure
of success over the recent past. Whether as cause or as effect, most major
central banks had been granted some kind of operational independence to
11941-06_Reis Comment_rev.qxd  1/26/10  11:34 AM  Page 166achieve this mandate. This had been accompanied by a remarkably stable
real economy, although the direction of causation between this stability
and good policy was always subject to debate.
This period of stability was important since it fueled a belief that episodes
of macroeconomic instability like those experienced in the 1970s, and a for-
tiori the 1930s, had been largely consigned to the history books. A standard
macroeconomic tool kit supported the inﬂation control and stabilization
strategies of central banks, with a central role for dynamic stochastic
general-equilibrium (DSGE) models. Unlike a previous generation of
practical macroeconomic models, these incorporated microeconomic
foundations grounded in stylized depictions of optimizing behavior and
forward-looking behavior derived from policymakers’ likely responses to
economic shocks. They therefore offered the promise of harmony between
economic theory and policy practice.
The chief problems underpinning the current crisis were, of course,
the build-up of leverage and the inflation of asset prices. This is the clas-
sic historical pattern observed before the onset of most financial crises in
the past (see Reinhart and Rogoff 2009). The available macroeconomic
models, particularly those developed by central banks, were ill equipped
to spot the dangers associated with this leverage and to understand the
implications for economic instability. Central banks have also tradition-
ally been given a central role in guaranteeing financial stability. But just
what this meant in practice was less clear than their responsibility for
controlling inflation and for economic stabilization more generally. And
there was nothing of comparable sophistication to the DSGE models to
help them fulfill this role.
Most of the debate about redesigning policy has therefore rightly focused
on how to refashion the policy architecture to prevent a repeat of the severe
difﬁculties in ﬁnancial markets that precipitated the current crisis. Although
there have been plenty of useful suggestions, we are still some way from
fully understanding what types of policies are needed and what kind 
of institutional framework will be necessary to support them. It seems
unlikely, however, that this wider macroprudential role can be achieved
solely through monetary policy, narrowly deﬁned.
It is now commonplace to observe that the standard model used to study
the conduct of monetary policy had scant role for ﬁnancial frictions. It has
been well understood for a while that the operation of the ﬁnancial system
should affect how the principal tool of monetary policy, the overnight inter-
est rate, affects real activity. The workhorse DSGE models, however, largely
marginalized these frictions. Its microfoundations basically had interest rate
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investment decisions, and the other to represent households’ intertemporal
optimization.
The ﬁrst hints that something was amiss in the global economy were
ﬁrmly apparent by 2006. Sitting as I did on the Monetary Policy Commit-
tee, I distinctly recall how, in 2006–07, our steering of overnight rates was
having relatively little impact on the economy or in reining in credit cre-
ation. Little concrete guidance for policy was coming from either the output
gap (however measured) or inflation. The economic expansion was not
remarkably rapid, and neither was inﬂation signaling an overheating econ-
omy. Instead, most of the danger signs were in asset prices and leverage
growth. In the end, interest rates were probably kept too low for too long.
But manipulation of overnight rates was never going to be an adequate tool
for combating the problems of excess credit creation during an expansion
such as this one.
Of course, there were many (mainly theoretical) models linking ﬁnancial
systems and real activity. Particularly important were those that described
the propagation, even the ampliﬁcation, of shocks via the collateral channel.
But these were mainly models where the behavior of ﬁnancial intermediaries
played little role. The key feature of the current crisis, and of many crises
before it, is that the shock was rooted inside the financial sector itself.
To anyone familiar with ﬁnancial history (see, for example, Kindleberger
1989), there is perhaps nothing surprising about this.
Recent events thus provide a big challenge to economic modeling and
policy analysis. Similar-looking events have occurred in the past, but they
were rare; hence, deciding what is specific to the present case and what
emerges as a general phenomenon requires careful judgment. It is a pipe
dream to think that one can build a coherent macroeconomic model that does
justice to the richness of modern ﬁnancial sectors. Models are generally use-
ful in economics because they are intelligible—they are judicious simpliﬁca-
tions that can describe general effects. But the complexity of the events
leading up to a major global crisis like this one can almost certainly not be
captured in a stylized model.
In this innovative and interesting paper, Ricardo Reis does three main
useful things. First, he offers a bird’s-eye view of the Federal Reserve’s
reaction in the face of a liquidity trap. Second, by dissecting the Federal
Reserve’s actions into three components—credit policy, quantitative pol-
icy, and interest rate policy—he provides a useful analytical framework
for thinking these actions through. Finally, as part of this exercise, Reis
sketches a novel model of ﬁnancial frictions and develops some aggregate
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conventional wisdom and new insights. It is a useful contribution to the
debate in this important area.
In their response to the current crisis, many central banks have engaged
in some kind of unconventional monetary policy in one or more of Reis’s
three categories. Table 1 below gives a sense of the kinds of measures
adopted before August 2009 by a number of leading central banks. A
common feature of many of the unconventional policies that Reis dis-
cusses is a blurring of the distinction between monetary and ﬁscal policy.
This can be explicit, as in the case of monetary ﬁnance of a ﬁscal transfer,
or more implicit, as when a central bank increases the risk on its balance
sheet. In time, therefore, the lessons from these unconventional policies
may lead us to modify our understanding of what it means for a central
bank to be independent.
Interest rate policy can be motivated in more or less conventional terms,
but when the overnight rate reaches its zero lower bound, unconventional
policy can be thought of as a second-best way of implementing a negative
shadow interest rate, in part by inﬂuencing inﬂation expectations. This has
been the approach taken, for example, by the Bank of England, which has
mainly been purchasing government securities at medium maturities and
boosting the supply of narrow money. Other central banks, such as Swe-
den’s Riksbank and the Bank of Canada, have accompanied such actions
with communications about the likely time path of interest rates, empha-
sizing a desire to keep the interest rate low. These strategies are not linked
to the fallout of the ﬁnancial crisis per se, but rather to the negative demand
shock that accompanied it.
Increasing the money supply through purchasing government securities
is what Reis calls quantitative policy. Here he restates the new conventional
wisdom that “reserves are irrelevant for the setting of interest rates or the
control of inﬂation.” And he restates the logic of the model and points out
that there is no reason why the expansion of reserves by the Federal Reserve
(or by other central banks) need be inﬂationary. I cannot help but feel, how-
ever, that the success of this view was partly responsible for policymakers’
lack of attention to the consequences of the growth of money and credit in
the run-up to the ﬁnancial crisis. The subsequent collapse of money and
credit growth is a useful diagnostic of the true underlying stance of mone-
tary policy in the downturn.
In his study of credit policy, in particular, Reis focuses on an immediate
problem in the aftermath of the crisis: the fact that the supply of credit to
the real economy is now impaired. And I agree with him that, in the near
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problems that motivate his model, resulting in an inefﬁciently low level of
ﬁnancial intermediation. In undertaking unconventional measures, the Fed-
eral Reserve and other central banks have certainly been mindful of their
potential to mitigate this outcome. Indeed, this has been the cornerstone of
the Federal Reserve’s policy response.
Such a credit policy creates a stimulus through a direct effect on asset
prices and by influencing the equilibrium interest rates and quantities of
credit available to businesses and households. But there are important
judgments to be made about where the greatest marginal effect can be
found. Also, public purchases of private sector assets create nontrivial
governance issues and public risk management concerns, making it
almost certain that central banks will wish to exit from this regime at the
earliest opportunity.
Although I admire what Reis is doing in this paper, at least one important
feature is missing from the core model of ﬁnancial markets that he uses to
study credit policy in the current context. This is the impossibility of the
model to generate excess credit creation. Although this omission is probably
not relevant in the aggregate at the moment, it is possible for central banks to
distort the allocation of credit, causing excess credit creation in some areas.
Thus, it is important to consider the sectoral credit impact as well as the
aggregate effects.
Better understanding of excess credit creation is important, since, as I have
already mentioned, it is a feature of almost all signiﬁcant ﬁnancial crises and
certainly of the current one. To fulﬁll their ﬁnancial stability mandate, cen-
tral banks will need to think more carefully about how to design credible
structures with appropriate policy instruments to prevent such excess credit
growth from recurring. Asking monetary policymakers to “lean against the
wind” in such situations is almost certainly inadequate. Although Reis’s
model is useful, it does not offer progress on this issue, by design. This
remains an open challenge for modeling.
It is probably too early to discern the pros and cons of different uncon-
ventional policies. Moreover, in the end their effects will be overdetermined,
making it unlikely that any amount of evidence will ever show their impact
precisely. The Federal Reserve and other central banks have acted decisively
to combat the downturn. A good deal of policy experimentation is already in
train, which will doubtless inform the next generation of policy models.
Reis’s paper is a ﬁne example of how quickly leading monetary economists
have also been responding to the challenges thrown up by this astonishing
episode.
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COMMENT BY
DONALD L. KOHN I appreciate the opportunity to comment on Ricardo
Reis’s paper. In this paper, Reis classiﬁes critical aspects of monetary pol-
icy over the past two years and uses models and his own analysis to inter-
pret and evaluate these policies. I very much enjoyed reading the paper and
thinking through the issues he raises and will discuss a few of them in my
remarks.
1
An important contribution of the paper is a new, stylized model of capi-
tal market frictions, which is used to study how credit policies affect capital
allocation by providing funds to different kinds of ﬁnancial intermediaries,
including nonbanks and institutional investors. I am not going to comment
much on the details of the model, but I do want to draw attention to the con-
clusion from the model that favors the provision of central bank credit to so-
called traders, which are characterized as financial intermediaries that
leverage their own capital as well as client funds to invest in securitized
loans. The Federal Reserve has indeed recognized the importance of securi-
tization, and working together with the Treasury, it created the Term Asset-
Backed Securities Loan Facility, or TALF, precisely to support the market
for securitized assets. In addition, by making credit available to primary
dealers, it supported trading and liquidity in a variety of securities markets.
However, this stylized model does not capture the heterogeneity in lend-
ing activity that we see in the economy. In the model, all loans are equally
eligible for securitization once they have been originated by the lenders.
Providing funds to traders thus beneﬁts all lenders and entrepreneurs simi-
larly. In reality, not every borrower would beneﬁt equally if the Federal
Reserve were to backstop only the securitized loan market without provid-
ing liquidity to commercial banks and other institutions. Banks and other
intermediaries are at least as important in ensuring a healthy ﬂow of credit
1. The views presented here are my own and not necessarily those of other members of
the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System or the Federal Open Market Com-
mittee. Elmar Mertens and Roberto Perli of the Board’s staff contributed to these remarks.
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to creditworthy borrowers, and it would be very disruptive if a scramble by
such intermediaries to meet funding shortfalls in a panic led to ﬁre sales of
assets or a freeze in lending. Thus, lending to banks should remain a central
part of the Federal Reserve’s toolbox.
I agree with Reis that, at least prior to his effort, no off-the-shelf model
was available for analyzing much of what has happened over the past two
years, and further research in this direction is essential. Still, we at the Fed-
eral Reserve were certainly not without guidance from well-established
principles when we formulated policies to address the ﬁnancial crisis. In
designing our liquidity facilities we were guided by the time-tested pre-
cepts derived from the work of Walter Bagehot.
2 Those precepts hold that
central banks can and should ameliorate financial crises by providing
ample credit to a wide set of borrowers, as long as the borrowers are sol-
vent, the loans are provided against good collateral, and a penalty rate is
charged. Such lending addresses discontinuities in investor behavior in a
crisis in which uncertainty sets off ﬂights to liquidity and safety that feed
on themselves and then circle back on the economy in adverse feedback
loops—a dynamic not fully captured by Reis’s model.
The liquidity measures we took during the financial crisis, although
unprecedented in their details, were generally consistent with Bagehot’s
principles and aimed at short-circuiting these feedback loops. The Fed-
eral Reserve lends only against collateral that meets specific quality
requirements, and it applies haircuts where appropriate. Beyond the col-
lateral, in many cases we also have recourse to the borrowing institution
for repayment. In the case of the TALF, we are backstopped by the Trea-
sury. In addition, the terms and conditions of most of our facilities are
designed to be unattractive under normal market conditions, thus preserv-
ing borrowers’ incentives to obtain funds in the market when markets 
are operating normally. Apart from a very small number of exceptions
involving systemically important institutions, such features have limited the
extent to which the Federal Reserve has taken on credit risk, and the overall
credit risk involved in our lending during the crisis has been small.
In Reis’s view, if the collateral had really been good, private institu-
tions would have lent against it. However, as has been recognized since
Bagehot, private lenders, acting to protect themselves, typically severely
curtail lending during a ﬁnancial crisis, irrespective of the quality of the
2. My colleague Brian Madigan (2009) evaluated the Federal Reserve’s recent policies
from this perspective.
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available collateral.3 The central bank—because it is not liquidity con-
strained and has the infrastructure in place to make loans against a vari-
ety of collateral—is well positioned to make those loans in the interest of
ﬁnancial stability, and can make them without taking on signiﬁcant credit
risk, as long as its lending is secured by sound collateral. A key function of
the central bank is to lend in such circumstances to contain the crisis and
mitigate its effects on the economy.
Reis’s model does not directly address central banks’ long-term asset
purchases, but in one place the paper seems to question their effectiveness.
Our framework for this aspect of our credit policies relied on preferred
habitats of investors and imperfect arbitrage. There was ample evidence
that private agents had especially strong preferences for safe and liquid
short-term assets in the crisis; in those circumstances, sizable purchases of
longer-term assets by the central bank can have an appreciable effect on
the cost of capital to households and businesses. The marked adjustments
in interest rates in the wake of the announcements of such actions, both in
the United States and elsewhere, suggest that market participants also saw
them in this light.
Reis raises the possibility that our credit policies, together with the pay-
ment of interest on reserves, could leave the Federal Reserve dependent on
the ﬁscal authorities for funding our expenses, with adverse implications
for our ability to conduct a sound monetary policy. This outcome seems
extremely remote. As I have already noted, the Federal Reserve’s exposure
to credit losses is quite limited. Certainly, the Federal Reserve’s interest
expense will increase when short-term rates move up from their current
very low level because of the payment of interest on reserve balances.
However, the Federal Reserve will continue to earn substantial net income
over the next few years under all but the most remote contingencies, for at
least two reasons. First, currency, on which we pay no interest, will remain
a substantial portion of our liabilities. And second, we will have sizable
earnings on our assets. Short-term interest rates would have to rise very
high very quickly for interest on reserves to outweigh the interest we are
earning on our longer-term asset portfolio. With the global economy weak
and inﬂation low, a large and rapid rise seems quite improbable. Moreover,
even in the unlikely event that a sharp rise in interest rates forced us to
3. In their Brookings Paper of last year, Stephen Morris and Hyun Song Shin (2008)
pointed out that the drying up of securitized lending was an important aspect of the constric-
tion on liquidity and the forced deleveraging of this crisis.
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suspend remittances to the Treasury temporarily, we would still maintain
our ability to implement monetary policy to foster our statutory objectives
of maximum employment and stable prices.
As Reis points out, paying interest on reserve balances also has important
beneﬁts and will play a key role in our exit from unusually accommodative
policies when the time comes. Raising the interest paid on those balances
should provide substantial leverage over other short-term market interest
rates because banks generally should not be willing to lend reserves in the
federal funds market at rates below what they could earn simply by holding
reserve balances.
4 Against that background, Reis questions why the Federal
Reserve is highlighting the availability of reserve-draining tools, since the
level of reserves should not impede the usual transmission mechanism of
tighter policy working through interest rates. However, neutralizing or
draining reserves could be helpful in tightening the link between the
interest rate on excess reserves and other short-term interest rates. And
the presence of a large volume of reserves on bank balance sheets—even
when remunerated—could have undesired effects on the portfolio decisions
of banks. So we continue to develop tools that enable the Federal Open Mar-
ket Committee (FOMC) to drain or neutralize large volumes of reserves
were the FOMC to decide that doing so would support its objectives.
5
Finally, Reis notes that the theoretical literature on monetary policy at the
zero lower bound commonly prescribes targeting higher-than-normal inﬂa-
tion rates even beyond the point of economic recovery, so that real interest
rates decline by more and thus provide greater stimulus for the economy.
The arguments in favor of such a policy hinge on a clear understanding on
the part of the public that the central bank will tolerate increased inﬂation
only temporarily—say, for a few years once the economy has recovered—
before returning to the original inﬂation target in the long term. Notably,
although many central banks have put their policy rates near zero, none have
adopted this prescription. In the theoretical environment considered by the
4. I would also note that there are large participants in the federal funds market—the
government-sponsored housing enterprises—that are not eligible to receive interest from the
Federal Reserve and thus may be willing to make reserves available in the federal funds
market at rates lower than the interest rate paid on reserves.
5. For example, the Federal Reserve could drain liquidity by engaging in reverse repur-
chase agreements with a range of counterparties, or it could offer banks the option of term
deposits, which would then not be available for lending in the federal funds market. The
Federal Reserve could also sell a portion of its holdings of securities. Any combination of
these tools, in addition to the payment of interest on reserves, may prove very valuable when
the time comes to tighten the stance of monetary policy—although, as the FOMC has said,
that time is not likely to come for an extended period.
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ever, the anchoring of inﬂation expectations has been a hard-won achieve-
ment of monetary policy over the past few decades, and we should not take
this stability for granted. Models are by their nature only a stylized represen-
tation of reality, and a policy of achieving “temporarily” higher inﬂation
over the medium term would run the risk of altering inﬂation expectations
beyond the horizon that is desirable. Were that to happen, the costs of bring-
ing expectations back to their current anchored state might be quite high. But
while the Federal Reserve has not attempted to raise medium-term inﬂation
expectations as prescribed by the theories discussed in the paper, it has taken
numerous steps to lower real interest rates for private borrowers and keep
inﬂation expectations from slipping to undesirably low levels in order to
prevent unwanted disinﬂation. These steps include the credit policies 
I discussed earlier, the provision of forward guidance that the level of
short-term interest rates is expected to remain “exceptionally low for an
extended period” conditional on the outlook for the economy and inﬂa-
tion, and the publication of the longer-run inﬂation objectives of FOMC
members.
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GENERAL DISCUSSION Deborah Lucas observed that there has not
been a sharp distinction between ﬁscal policy and monetary policy in the
recent crisis, and that a lot of what has been described as monetary policy
was actually ﬁscal policy. Although she understood the need for immediate
action, she found it worrisome that many economists seem to have so easily
accepted the Federal Reserve’s decision to take actions outside the normal
course of oversight by Congress. Lucas went on to cite a piece of anecdotal
evidence about the possible consequences. The advance business of the
Federal Home Loan banks, a large source of capital for smaller banks, has
dropped by about a third since the crisis began. The banks’ explanation is
that the Federal Reserve is outcompeting them in the business of making
risky loans: their customers are no longer interested in borrowing from
them because they are getting such sweet deals from the central bank.
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the Federal Reserve’s independence? The answer, presumably, is that the
Federal Reserve needs to be able to make the difficult and unpopular
decisions necessary to keep inflation down. Lately, however, the Federal
Reserve has been making the popular decisions. That should not become a
habit.
Robert Gordon raised what he viewed as a fundamental issue about the
ability of a central bank to manage expectations. When the Japanese had
their dismal decade, and the Bank of Japan finally woke up and began to
relax monetary policy, inﬂation expectations did not spontaneously revive.
Gordon thought that Paul Krugman’s 1998 Brookings Paper on the liquidity
trap in Japan, although it drew nice parallels with the late 1930s that are still
relevant today, was off base in implying that a central bank can control inﬂa-
tion expectations by exhortation. The alternative model, which holds that
inﬂation expectations are based on inertia and experience, seems closer to
the reality.
Gordon argued further that one hears it too often asserted today that large
federal deﬁcits are bound to lead to inﬂation, when in fact the risk of deﬂa-
tion is much more serious; if current forecasts are correct, the unemployment
gap will soon have never been so high for so long. Either the modern version
of the Phillips curve is going to be contradicted over the next four years, or a
signiﬁcant deﬂation is likely in the absence of a collapse of the dollar or an
explosion of oil prices.
Gita Gopinath observed that a frequently heard argument in the run-up to
the crisis was that one reason why interest rates were so low was the global
savings glut. She wondered whether the Federal Reserve still held that view
and whether it will continue to play an important role in the postcrisis
recovery period. She also wondered how much the outcome relies on China
retaining its appetite for U.S. assets and on China’s high saving rate.
Christopher Sims agreed with Donald Kohn that the likelihood of nega-
tive seigniorage and balance sheet problems at the Federal Reserve is quite
remote, but just how remote, he argued, depends on whether the Federal
Reserve has thought through what it would do in that situation, and on how
completely people are convinced that the Federal Reserve is prepared for
it. The problem, as Sims saw it, is not the possibility of a small or even a
fairly large capital loss on the private assets. It has to do with what would
happen if there were a sudden shift in sentiment, in which, for example, the
dollar’s role as a reserve asset suddenly started to deteriorate, the exchange
rate started dropping, and inﬂationary pressure began to build. The need
for extraordinarily high interest rates might arise, especially if the public
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problem.
Sims also agreed with Kohn on the importance of inﬂation expectations
being well anchored and on the difﬁculty of restoring the anchor once lost.
But if an anchor can stabilize the boat in a storm, it can also drag it under the
water. Japan, after all, has very well anchored inﬂation expectations. The
problem is that one would like to anchor expectations from above and
below, by convincing people that the Federal Reserve is concerned not only
about possible future inﬂation, but also about inﬂation falling below roughly
2 percent.
Sims disputed the idea, implied in the paper, that there is no social cost to
the Federal Reserve creating interest-bearing reserves. That is true in terms
of paper and printing costs, but interest-bearing reserves are interest-bearing
government debt. The only reason a central bank balance sheet matters
is that its independence depends on its ability to raise revenue through
seigniorage. If the central bank’s capital is seriously insufﬁcient, there are
limits to how strongly anti-inﬂationary it can be without recourse to explicit
ﬁscal backing.
Sims also underlined the point made by others that the lines between
monetary and ﬁscal policy are becoming blurred. Interest-bearing reserves
do not count against the federal debt limit right now. But if interest rates
were to rise substantially while reserves remained at their current level, Con-
gress might well become interested in this distinction. The Federal Reserve
and academic economists should be thinking about what happens in these
extreme scenarios: both about what would be good ﬁscal policy, and about
what the Federal Reserve should ask for if it should fall under this kind of
ﬁscal pressure.
David Romer thought the paper’s model provided a helpful framework
for thinking about multiple layers of frictions in a very complicated environ-
ment. But although the model is as simple as one could make it, it is still hard
to grasp intuitively. He asked where the special ability of the Federal
Reserve to improve outcomes was coming from and suggested two possibil-
ities: either it is a special technological skill that makes the Federal Reserve
good at keeping people from absconding, or it is an ability to essentially
break private contracts. Private individuals cannot make their debt more
senior than a prior lender’s, but the Federal Reserve can, and the knowledge
of this capability presumably feeds back into the equilibrium. Romer also
wondered whether there is something unique about the independence of the
Federal Reserve that requires that it retain the ability to set its own budget.
Many government agencies are and should be independent, including the
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many of those agencies could legitimately derive a stream of revenue from
pursuing their government business. Yet Congress in all cases sets their bud-
get. Why is the Federal Reserve different?
Christopher Carroll found it striking that both Donald Kohn and Timothy
Besley—the one a current, the other a former policymaker—had expressed
great concern about the lack of useful macroeconomic models for the current
circumstances. A century and a half after Bagehot, this might still be the
most important question for macroeconomists to address today. Why, then,
does there seem to be an intellectual block on the topic? One reason might be
that macroeconomists are reluctant to abandon the equilibrium rational
expectations approach, but in a model where everyone understands every-
thing about how the entire model works, there is not the feedback from past
events into expectations about the future needed to capture what is going on.
Carroll argued that developing such a well-articulated framework ought to
be macroeconomists’ top priority.
Benjamin Friedman agreed with Sims on the need for symmetry in cen-
tral banks’ expression of objectives for inflation, whether it be embod-
ied in formal inﬂation targets or in terms of stated objectives within a dual-
mandate system. The classic example of the lack of such symmetry today
is the European Central Bank, which cannot even bring itself to say out
loud that deﬂation is bad and instead expresses its objective as “inﬂation of
no more than 2 percent.”
Friedman agreed with the paper’s assertion that there is nothing particu-
larly wrong with a central bank having negative capital. What, then, is
the real risk to Federal Reserve independence? The prospect of the Federal
Reserve needing outright funding from Congress is remote, he argued, but
the problem is that certain policies were pursued precisely because Congress
would not have provided that funding. Friedman conjectured that in the
event the Federal Reserve does realize serious losses on its recently acquired
assets, it will become clear that it has been pursuing ﬁscal policy without
congressional approval, and the political reaction to that is likely not to be
subtle. It might not be limited to taking away the Federal Reserve’s authority
to set its own budget, as David Romer suggested, or placing other limits on
its powers while leaving its independence with respect to monetary policy
intact. The fallout could be a diminution of the Federal Reserve’s indepen-
dence not only with respect to its own budget but also on more fundamental
matters.
Vincent Reinhart noted that in the models that monetary policymakers
use, policy works its effects through current and expected short-term interest
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unconventional policies should be viewed as commitment devices to lock
in that current and expected future path of the short-term rate, or rather as
a revealed preference, that is, as demonstrating that policymakers actually
believe that monetary policy works through different channels. On that
score, the various facilities that the Federal Reserve has created and the
actions it has taken amount to a very long list of potential channels of mon-
etary policy. They probably mark, in Reinhart’s view, the beginning of
a substantial expansion of the way macroeconomics is done, either to
explain what policymakers thought they were doing in recent months or,
having identiﬁed the channels through which policy actually works, com-
ing up with different models.
Michael Woodford sympathized with the Federal Reserve’s concern that
any tolerance of temporarily higher inﬂation on its part might be misunder-
stood and pose a threat to its hard-won credibility. Indeed, he argued, mone-
tary policymakers need to think about not only what will happen if people
understand what the central bank says, but as a practical matter, what alter-
native interpretations people might give to its words and actions, and what
will happen as a consequence. Theoretical analyses that simply assume that
people understand the same things the policymaker understands fail to
address this. Policymakers need to think more about how to explain policy
so that it can be understood and therefore effective, rather than simply give
up on the public’s ability to understand a nuanced policy. Woodford himself
had previously proposed one approach to better public understanding, one
that described monetary policy in terms of catch-up to some price-level path
or a path of nominal GDP.
Woodford felt the Federal Reserve has been too reluctant to think about
having an articulated strategy as the basis for the credibility of its inﬂation
commitment. The Federal Reserve appears to perceive no payoff from such
a strategy, and instead simply lets the public observe the inﬂation rates deliv-
ered in the past. The current situation, however, illustrates a weakness of that
approach: when one asks if it is ever possible to have temporarily higher
inﬂation expectations without undermining longer-run inﬂation credibility,
the answer has to be no, because that undermines the basis of the Federal
Reserve’s approach to controlling long-run inflation expectations. An
explicit strategy, such as price-level path targeting, that justiﬁed the tempo-
rary inﬂation, in the context of a strategy that would nonetheless imply no
change in long-run inﬂation, would allow a way around this constraint.
John Williams observed that one way to improve the management of
inﬂation expectations might be to publish interest rate forecasts, as is done in
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partway out the yield curve—using purchases not of long-term Treasuries,
but of those in the short to middle range of maturities—as a way of reinforc-
ing the view that the central bank intends to keep interest rates low for a
while. Such policies could be useful for a central bank seeking to maintain a
low inﬂation target in a zero-lower-bound world.
Williams also worried that the next recession might not look at all like the
present one. It might be one where the only tools available are the short-term
interest rate and maybe some other quantitative easing policies. The toolbox
would be smaller because in the absence of a ﬁnancial crisis, the alternative
tools being used so freely today would not be appropriate.
Richard Cooper wondered whether anything beyond the discomfort of its
accountants prevents the Federal Reserve from having negative capital for-
ever. The capital of a central bank, after all, seems to be a completely arbi-
trary number. This is more evident with other central banks than with the
Federal Reserve, because a much larger share of their assets is in the form 
of foreign exchange reserves, so that the relationship between the central
bank’s assets and its liabilities is changing all the time as exchange rates
change. Cooper reminded the Panel that a policy of devaluing the currency
does not generalize to all countries. Moreover, a deliberate depreciation of
the dollar is not a feasible policy for the United States, because other coun-
tries will not allow it. We now have a global capital market, with large pools
of savings outside the United States and the United Kingdom. Long-term
interest rates today are determined in that market, and not by the monetary
policy of any particular country or countries, including the United States.
David Laibson observed that although the traditional bank run, where
people line up outside the bank to withdraw deposits, is no longer a threat,
there is now something that could be called a “modern” bank run, in which
institutional sources of short-term credit are suddenly withdrawn because of
worries that everyone else is withholding credit. This kind of bank run is
obviously what afﬂicted Bear Stearns and Lehman Brothers, and the concern
was that it would spread through the entire ﬁnancial sector that was not in
some sense federally insured. Laibson understood Federal Reserve policy as
partly motivated by the need to avoid this kind of disorderly liquidation, and
many of its actions follow from that motive. He wondered why the discus-
sion was not more about the Federal Reserve’s efforts to avoid these bank
runs as an organizing principle for a lot of the transactions that ended up
changing policy in general, and the Federal Reserve’s balance sheet speciﬁ-
cally. Linda Goldberg responded by pointing out that much of the debate on
changes in the ﬁnancial architecture is speciﬁcally targeted at this issue and
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Corporation, which currently is limited to banks and does not extend, for
example, even to bank holding companies.
Xavier Gabaix observed that monetary policy during the crisis has exhib-
ited creativity and originality, but the same cannot be said about ﬁscal pol-
icy, which has been desperately old-fashioned and uncreative. He would like
to see some institutional innovation in ﬁscal policy, perhaps the creation of a
Federal Reserve equivalent of ﬁscal policy. For example, some ability on the
part of the central bank to change things like payroll taxes during a downturn
would be useful. Gabaix argued that it is good to have fair-minded tech-
nocrats making these decisions rather than short-term-focused politicians.
Carmen Reinhart recommended expanding the paper’s scope to a more
international setting, given that the crisis is global. A global framework
would be particularly useful for the treatment of inflation expectations,
because in only two postwar banking crises did the crisis country’s currency
actually appreciate: Japan in the 1990s and the United States today. More
generally, when one looks at all the new facilities that have been created, it is
clear that the buyers were coming from somewhere else, and the setting of
interest rates thus has a distinctly global element.
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